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ABSTRACT

An assumption widely shared among Western observers is that
the normalization of East-West relations will lead ultimately to a
loosening of the bonds between the Soviet Union and its East European
allies. It is the purpose of this paper to assess the evolution of
the East European alliance system during the period of diminished
tension between East and West.
The disintegrative tendencies within the alliance are by now
well-known: Yugoslavia and Albania have successfully withdrawn from
the alliance; Soviet troops have been sent to "normalize" situations
in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia; and for a decade Rumania
has pursued policies at odds with those of its allies. It would be
premature, however, to see those developments as indicative of the
dissolution of the alliance. A number of factors, not the least of
which is the presence of the Red Army in four East European countries,
are operating to maintain cohesion; and there is evidence to suggest
that considerations of domestic political security may constitute a
new cementing element in the alliance.
By 1970, it had become apparent that the process of change in
the Soviet bloc had yielded a new form of relations among the states
of Eastern Europe. Under the rubric of ’’socialist internationalism,"
this new form of relations has manifested itself in a new drive for
economic integration, in an expansion of the political role of the
Warsaw Treaty Organization, in an intensive ideological campaign, and
in a coordinated policy of cooperation with the West.
In an important sense, however, the unity of the past few
years is deceptive, for among the East European leaders there are two
opposing tendencies: one impelling them toward closer unity in the
interests of immediate political security, and the other impelling
them to seek greater independence from the Soviet Union. Although
the question of which impulse will prevail will be determined by the
course of domestic events in Eastern Europe and by the progress of
detente, the most likely outcome for the near future is what one
Polish scholar has termed a "shifting of forces," a process whereby
the states of Eastern Europe would be afforded greater room for
maneuver within the existing alliance framework.

vii

THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET BLOC

INTRODUCTION

The character of contemporary East-West relations is generally
understood in terms of detente.

No consensus exists, however, as to

the precise meaning of detente or its implications.

Though a

distinction is commonly made between detente as a psychological
phenomenon--implying a general relaxation of tension--and detente
as a set of substantive policies, the meaning of detente remains a
topic of debate.
Similar disagreement exists concerning the possible impact
of detente on the Soviet-sponsored East European alliance system.
Recent changes in the international environment--including the
increased economic cooperation between East and West, the arms
limitations agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union,
and the various West German initiatives associated with Ostpolitik-suggest the possibility of a profound systemic impact on the Eastern
bloc.

Simultaneously, however, the reiteration of the Brezhnev

doctrine of limited sovereignty and the Soviet drive for ideological
unity within the socialist system indicate a continued determination
to maintain alliance cohesion.
The disintegrative tendencies within the Soviet bloc are by
now well-known.

Of the eight communist states in Eastern Europe, two

have successfully withdrawn from the alliance:
and Albania, in 1962.

Yugoslavia, in 1948,

Though still a member of the alliance,

2

3

Rumania has pursued an increasingly independent foreign policy line
since the mid 1960s.

Soviet troops have been sent to "normalize"

crises in the alliance three times:

in East Germany in 1953, in

Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Poland, too,

submitted to strong Soviet pressure in resolving political crises in
1956 and 1970.

Of the East European alliance members, only Bulgaria

has followed without serious challenge the prescribed Soviet line in
both foreign and domestic policies.
The developments of the 1970s have introduced into the
alliance a new set of potentially disruptive tendencies.

The rapid

expansion of East-West trade, as well as local variations in economic
development, have seriously undermined established trade relations
within the alliance.

Additionally, the developing East-West detente

and the stabilization of the territorial situation in Eastern Europe
have diminished the military threat which the Warsaw Treaty Organization
was formed to counter.
It would be premature, however, to see these developments
as indicative of the dissolution of the alliance.

A number of

factors, not the least of which is the presence of the Red Army in
several East European countries, are operating to maintain alliance
cohesion.

At the very least, the maintenance of close formal ties

among the socialist states of Eastern Europe remains of vital
importance to the political security of the various Party leaders.
Ideological considerations aside, the simple fact of geographic
proximity to a large and powerful neighbor severely limits the range
of alternatives available to the East European countries.

4

The conflicting developments of the past few years point to
a need for a systematic study of the East European alliance in the
period of developing detente between East and West.

It is clear that

the alliance is a vastly different one from that which existed,
say, twenty years ago.

The precise nature of the transformation,

however, is far from clear.

Are the ideological ties among the

socialist states sufficiently strong to maintain cohesion?

Will

considerations of political security replace military considerations
as a cementing element in the alliance?

Will the alliance evolve

into an authentic socialist commonwealth, in which each member would
be afforded greater latitude to pursue independent policies?

Or

will the alliance simply disintegrate, to be replaced by a framework
of bilateral and multilateral arrangements in Eastern Europe?
The year 1975 is particularly appropriate for an assessment
of the Soviet bloc.

It marks the conclusion of the long awaited

agreement on security and cooperation in Europe.

It also marks the

twentieth anniversary of the Warsaw Pact and the thirtieth anniver
sary of the beginning of the Soviet bloc, which has already
established itself as one of the more enduring alliances.

Alliances:

Theories and Propositions

In the last twenty years, a vast number of theories and
propositions concerning the behavior of international alliances have
been advanced.

The unfortunate truth is that there are not too few

theories, but too many:

for virtually every assertion concerning

alliance behavior, there exists another assertion stating the opposite

idea.

Nevertheless, it is possible to list a few of the more widely

shared, or at least

the most commonly stated, theories and proposi

tions about alliances.
Alliance theories generally fall into one of three categorie
the formation of alliances, ‘alliance performance, and alliance
duration and disintegration.

What follows will be a survey of some

of the more widely accepted propositions and of those which are
particularly relevant to the alliance system in Eastern Europe.
Theories concerning alliance formation are concerned with
the questions of why alliances are formed and of what criteria are
involved in the decision to enter into an alliance.

Most theorists -

agree that alliances are formed primarily to counter an external
threat.

George Liska, for example, has argued that external threat,

rather than national strength or weakness, is the primary source of
alliances.1

Liska1s proposition was stated in somewhat different

*

form by K. J. Holsti, who held that nations undertake alliance
commitments with nations which face similar external problems.^
Although a case might be made for this line of argument as applied
specifically to the formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, it
is clear that the alliance system in its early stages was simply
imposed on Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union.

^-George Liska, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore:
Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 13.

Johns

^K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for
Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Publishing Co
1967), p. 110.
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Closer to the mark is a proposition by Harold Guetzkow, who
held that the less successful a nation?s experience with self-reliant
policies, the greater the tendency to join

alliances.^

The fact

that Eastern Europe has for centuries been consigned a dependency
status has implications both for the reasons for the formation of the
Soviet bloc and for its persistence.

In a more specific sense, the

geopolitical results of World War Two provided the Soviet Union with
an opportunity to impose an alliance on East European leaders who
were scarcely in a position to resist.
Theories related to alliance performance are concerned with
the cohesion and effectiveness of alliances and with the distribution
of influence within alliances.

Probably the most widely stated of

all the propositions about alliances is that cohesion depends upon
external danger and declines as the threat is reduced.

This hypo

thesis, derived from the studies of small group behavior by German
sociologist Georg Simmel,^ has been restated in one form or another

O

^Harold Guetzkow, "Isolation and Collaboration: A Partial
Theory of Inter-Nation Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution 1
(1957):54.
^Georg Simmel, Conflict (New York:
pp. 92-93.

Free Press, 1955),
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by Kenneth Boulding, Arnold Wolfers, and many others.-*
If the hypothesis is valid, one would expect that the general
relaxation of tension between East and West would have a profound
and divisive impact on NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and
the Soviet bloc.

The acceptance of this hypothesis has been reflected

in Secretary of State Kissinger1s defense of the policy of ddtente
as part of an evolutionary process leading to the liberalization of
the societies of Eastern Europe and to the loosening of the East
European alliance.

In response to a question during the hearings on

his nomination to be Secretary of State, Kissinger stated,
. . . about ten years ago it was axiomatic in the intellectual
community and among students of foreign policy that the reason
the Soviet system was able to maintain its authoritarian hold
was because of its invocation of foreign danger, and that to the
degree that the foreign danger diminished it would not be able
to maintain the more repressive aspects of its system. And I
believe that, in the long run, this will turn out to be a correct
judgment, because, in a way, as we live in a world in which
these countries become more related to the free countries and
economically more interdependent, the pressures . . . are going
to become more numerous.^
Two other hypotheses, however, suggest the existence of

^Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962), p. 162; and Arnold
Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1962), p. 29.
For an extensive listing of these and other alliance
theories, see Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D.
Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances:
Comparative Studies (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973),
Appendix C.
^f,Excerpts from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Hearings on the Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger to be Secretary
of State," in Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1969; expanded edition, 1974),
p. 211.
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cohesive factors in the alliance.

Haas and Whiting argued in 1956

that centralization of alliance decision-making contributes to
greater cohesion.^

In this regard, the record of the East European

alliance system is mixed:

while it is clear that the Soviet Union

remains the dominant force, it is equally clear that the junior
partners in the alliance have greatly improved their bargaining
power within the decision-making structures.

A related proposition

advanced by Liska holds that ua hegemonic alliance would repress
strains underneath the supremacy of the leading ally.*1^

The

question which emerges from consideration of this proposition is
whether the preponderant power of the Soviet Union is in itself
sufficient to maintain cohesion in the alliance.
The third category of propositions about alliance behavior
is concerned with alliance duration and disintegration.

Host

prominent among- these is the logical extension of the various
hypotheses concerning external danger and alliance cohesion:
external threat disappears, alliances disintegrate.

as

Since external

threat is not likely to disappear in any absolute sense, however,
concern might better be directed toward the question of the extent
to which the invocation of external danger acts as a genuine
cohesive element affecting alliances.
A factor not yet mentioned is the role of ideology in

^Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, Dynamics of International
Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1956), p. 183.
®Liska, Nations in Alliance, p. 73.

9

alliances.

Richard Lowenthal, Herbert Dinerstein and others have

argued that common ideology may. provide a source of alliance unity,
though Dinerstein adds that the need for ideological homogeneity
betrays underlying tendencies toward disintegration.^

It should be

added that under Marxism-Leninism, ideology takes on an added
dimension:

it affects the very legitimacy of the Communist Party.

As regards Eastern Europe, it is clear that any threat to the politi
cal security of the Party leadership would provide a powerful
inducement toward alliance unity.
In summary, the theoretical literature on alliance behavior
constitutes a vast potential storehouse for the systematic investi
gation of the East European alliance.

Of the many propositions

surveyed here, however, only a few have been applied to studies of
the situation in Eastern Europe.

Recent Studies of the Soviet Bloc
The great majority of studies of the East European alliance
have been traditional descriptive analyses.

Even a brief survey of

the major scholars would have to include such names as Bromke,

^Richard Lowenthal, "Factors of Unity and Factors of
Conflict.11 Annals 349 (September 1963):107; and Herbert Dinerstein,
"The Transformation of Alliance Systems," American Political Science
Review 59 (September 1965):601.
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Brzezinski, Ionescu, London, Rubinstein, and U lam .^

Without

necessarily endorsing Adam Ulam’s scornful reference to the Mnew
and militant faith called b e h a v i o r a l i s m , i t can fairly be said
that most of the current knowledge of the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe has come from the work of the area specialists.

At least

two factors may account for the persistence of traditional modes
of analysis in Communist studies.

First, the relative scarcity of

reliable data precludes the application of scientific techniques
in a number of areas of inquiry.

Second, the supposed uniqueness

of the Communist system has, until recently, deterred scholars from
attempting comparative analyses.
The first attempt away from the area studies approach was
the totalitarian model, which dominated Communist studies during the

l^A partial listing of books written or edited by these
authors includes Adam Bromke and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, eds.,
The Communist States in Disarray, 1965-1971 (Minneapolis, Minnesota:
University of Minnesota Press, 1967); Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The
Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1967); Ghita Ionescu, The Breakup of the Soviet
Empire in Eastern Europe (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965); Kurt
London, ed., Eastern Europe in Transition (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1964); Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed., Communist Political
Systems (New York: New York University Press, 1966); and Adam
B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign
Policy 1917-1967 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968).
HA da m B. Ulam, **USA: Some Critical Reflections,*1
Survey 50 (January, 1964):57.
For another view, see Frederick J. Fleron, Jr., "Soviet
Area Studies and the Social Sciences: Some Methodological Problems
in Communist Studies,** Soviet Studies 19 (January 1968):
313-39.

11

1950s and the early 1960s.

12

Useful as it may have been as an

alternative to traditional analysis, the totalitarian model failed
to provide a conceptual framework for the analysis of change in
Communist systems.

The problem was not that the model failed to

allow for change in any form, but that it limited itself to those
^
changes which were initiated by the regimes in power. 1 J

Moreover,

the totalitarian model provided little insight into the nature of the
Communist interstate system.
By the early 1960s, the totalitarian model was increasingly
seen as inadequate for the analysis of Communist systems.

It was

argued, for example, that Friedrich and Brzezinski's five pre
requisites for a totalitarian system had diminished in significance
with the decline in ideology, the growth of bureaucratic elites,
and the decline in terroristic police tactics.^

Among the alterna

tive models presented were the model of the one-party state, the

•^The most prominent of the early books on totalitarianism are
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt
Brace, 1951); and Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski,
eds., Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1956).
For more recent studies, see Carl J. Friedrich, Jr.,
"Totalitarianism: Recent Trends," Problems of Communism 18 (May/June
1968):32-43; and Robert Burrowes, "Totalitarianism: The Revised
Standard Version," World Politics 21 (January 1969):272-294.
13por a discussion of totalitarianism and change, see
Chalmers Johnson, "Comparing Communist Nations," in Change in
Communist Systems, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 1-32.
^Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and
Autocracy, pp. 9-10; and Allan Kassof, "The Administered Society:
Totalitarianism Without Terror«" World Politics 16 (July 1964):558-75.
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bureaucratic model, and the structural-functional model.^
More importantly, scholars began to attach significance to
change, rather than to stability, in Communist systems.

16

The

proliferation of new models in the late 1960s reflected both an
emphasis on the process of change and an attempt to apply techniques
used in studies of non-Communist systems.^

In addition to analyzing

the processes of modernization and political development, recent
studies have been concerned with such factors as nationalism,
ideology, bureaucracy, and the roles of elites and interest groups
in both national and cross-national studies. 18

At the interstate

level, the new concern with change was reflected in the "polycentrism"

15S ee, for example, Robert C. Tucker, "Toward a Comparative
Politics of Movement Regimes," American Political Science Review 55
(June. 1961):281-93; T. H. Rigby, "Traditional, Market, and
Organizational Societies and the USSR," World Politics 16 (July 1964):
539—57; and Frederick C . Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (New York:
Little, Brown and Co., 1966).
16S ee, for example, Johnson, Change in Communist Systems; and
Andrzej Korbonski, "The Prospects for Change in Eastern Europe,"
Slavic Review 34 (March 1975):219-39.
l^For an excellent discussion of recent trends in Communist
studies, see Paul Shoup, "Comparing Communist Nations: Prospects
for an Empirical Approach," American Political Science Review 62
(March 1968):185-204.
18S ee, for example, Dennis Clark Pirages, Modernization and
Political-Tension Management: A Socialist Society in Perspective
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972); Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary
Breakthroughs and National Development (Berkeley, California:
University of California Press, 1971); Paul E. Einner, International
Communism: Ideology, Organization, Strategy (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1963); H. Gordon Skilling, ed., Interest Groups in Soviet
Politics(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971);
and Barry T. Farrell, ed., Political Leadership in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970).

13

literature of the mid- to late-1960s. 19
Finally, the so-called "behavioral revolution" has begun
to have an impact on Communist studies. 20

In the face of a number

of constraints inherent in the study of closed political systems,
however, behaviorally oriented Communist studies have achieved
only limited success.

Surveys of recent emigrants from Communist

East Europe, for example, have been justly criticized for having
been drawn from a biased sample.

An encouraging sign for the

behavioralists, however, is the recent accumulation of more reliable
data, much of which is being generated from within the Communist
countries themselves.
The continuing dichotomy between the behavioralists and the
anti-behavioralists notwithstanding, it is becoming increasingly
obvious that there is no one best method in Communist studies.
The most encouraging sign of the past few years is that the previous
emphasis on stability has given way to concern for the nature and
direction of change in Communist systems at both the national and
international levels.

■^"Polycentrism," which in the strictest sense denotes the
existence of multiple centers for the legitimate interpretation of
Marxism-Leninism, has been used by many scholars to describe the
disintegration of the Soviet bloc.
See, for example, Richard T. deGeorge, The New Marxism (New
York: Pegasus Publishing Co., 1968); and Walter Laqueur and Leopold
Labedz, eds., Polycentrism (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962).
20For two recent collections of behavioral works, see Roger
E. Kanet, ed., The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies
(New York: Free Press, 1971); and Johnson, Change in Communist
Systems.
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Alliance Transformation
Because of its commitment to a utopian ideology and because
of the preponderant power of the Soviet Union, the Soviet bloc is
an alliance particularly resistant to change.

To an extent

unparalleled in the history of alliances, stability in the Soviet
bloc depends on the uniformity of its members.

Both Marxist-Leninist

doctrine, on which the very legitimacy of the East European leaders
rests, and practical political considerations preclude significant
deviations from the accepted pattern of uniformity.
According to Lenin*s interpretation of Marx, history is
governed by universally applicable laws of socioeconomic development
which must be uniformly followed by the Communist parties in their
•positions at the vanguard of the progression toward Communism.
Any manifestation among the Communist parties of different inter
pretations of historical laws, therefore, weakens both the solidarity
of the movement and the position of the parties within their own
societies.

Moreover, close cohesion of the states of the Soviet

bloc is ideologically required for the simultaneous entry into
socialism and for the eventual achievement of Communism on an
international scale.
Closely related to the ideological imperatives of close unity
are a number of practical political considerations.

Hie preservation

of political security in Eastern Europe requires the maintenance of
existing patterns of control over the economy, the military, the
press, and virtually every other area of political and social activity.

15

Since all states are said to be governed by the same historical laws,
any change in the nature of political control in one state ultimately
would raise demands for change in other states.

The 1968

Czechoslovak experiment to allow political participation outside of
the Communist Party, for example, threatened political security
throughout Eastern Europe.
Thus, cohesion acquires far greater importance in the Soviet
bloc than it does, say, in the NATO alliance or in the Common Market.
If the requirement for alliance cohesion has remained a constant
theme in the Soviet bloc, however, the means by which that require
ment has been satisfied have varied considerably.

It can be said, in

fact, that the major changes in alliance relationships have been
associated with efforts to construct integrative links designed to
promote cohesion through means short of coercion.
Although "cohesion" and "integration" are often used
interchangeably, there is an important distinction between the
terms:

where "cohesion" denotes a uniformity of thought and action,

"integration" refers to the process whereby distinct units are linked
in specific areas of their activities.

In this vein, Liska has

observed,
One may ask "how much cohesion?" referring to the degree
that allies stay together and act together. And one may ask,
"how much integration?" implying how intimately allies must be^
tied together so that they cannot act separately.^
The distinction is not merely a matter of semantics, for in an

^Liska, Nations in Alliance, p. 116.

16

analysis of the Soviet bloc in particular, apparent conformity may
obscure fundamental changes in interstate relations.
Where cohesion is seen as the degree of uniformity at a
given time, integration is a dynamic process of growing interaction
which produces greater interdependence and which may promote a more
stable cohesion.

Thus, the special concern of any analysis of

alliance transformation, particularly in the Soviet bloc, is the
process of integration.
Perhaps the most useful definition for this analysis is that
of Horton Kaplan, who defined integrative processes as "processes
which join systems or organizations with separate institutions and
goals within a common framework providing for the common pursuit of at
least some goals the common implementation of at least some policies.’
At the most basic level, then, an analysis of alliance transformation
should be concerned with the nature and direction of change in the
following elements:

alliance purpose or function, the influence and

interests of alliance units, the structural framework of the alliance,
and alliance policies.

Accordingly, this analysis will assess the

patterns of change in the alliance, primarily during the period from
1956 to 1968, and will investigate the altered nature of alliance
relations since 1970.
Despite the similarities of the invasion of Hungary in 1956
and the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the period between

99
^Morton
A.. Kaplan, System and Process in International
Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), p. 98.
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those two dates was one of profound change in the Soviet bloc.
Following the revolutionary upheavals in Eastern Europe in the late
1940s and early 1950s, the East European leaders were confronted
with new demands which were ill served by the existing alliance
framework.

It was this deficiency which Nikita Khrushchev sought

to remedy through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). During the same
period, however, the impact of Sino-Soviet split on existing
polycentric tendencies served to upset the ideological unity of the
alliance and to introduce new disruptive tendencies into the bloc.
By the end of that period, the patterns of change in the
bloc had generated a new form of alliance relations designed to
serve new purposes.

Under the rubric of "socialist internationalism,"

this new form of relations has been characterized by a new emphasis
on voluntary cooperation and by acconmodation of pluralistic tendencies,
moderated of course by continued Soviet predominance.

Moreover, the

new form of alliance relations became intimately tied to the
emerging policy of cooperation with the West.
Where alliance developments in the 1950s and the early 1960s
were determined by the profound domestic changes in Eastern Europe,
the course of the alliance relations since that time has been
primarily affected by the nature of external developments.

In

bilateral relations with the West and at the recently concluded
European security conference, the Soviet bloc has demonstrated a
new solidarity which reflects an awareness of both the possible
benefits and the possible dangers of cooperation with the West.

18

Although it can be said that the nature of change in the
Soviet bloc in the future will be determined by the progress of
detente and by the course of events domestically in Eastern Europe,
it is too early to specify the precise direction of that change.

A

number of trends in the alliance are only beginning to become
apparent, and a number of contradictory developments have yet to be
resolved.

As one prominent scholar on Eastern Europe has noted,

The purpose of scholarly study should be to acquire knowledge
about the relatively clear tendencies of the past and the much
less discernible trends of the present, and to indicate a range
of possible alternatives for the near future. It cannot,
however, forecast which of these prospects will in fact material
ize, nor foresee entirely new ones, which will, no doubt, make
themselves evident in the long r u n . ^ 3

oo

H. Gordon Skilling, The Governments of Communist East
Europe (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Publishing Co., 1966),
p. 228.

CHAPTER I

FROM BUDAPEST TO PRAGUE
By 1953, the foundations for the alliance system in Eastern
Europe had been laid.

In the East European states, the processes

of state-building and the tasks of consolidating power had largely
been achieved, and the more convulsive aspects of revolutionary
social transformation had been endured.

Everywhere loyal Stalinists

were entrenched as leaders of the new socialist states.
Notably lacking in the Stalinist system were any formal
institutions designed to promote integration within the bloc.

Those

institutions which did exist were designed more to meet existing
demands than to form the basis for future integration.

Cominform,

established in 1948 to counter Yugoslav ambitions and to restore
ideological purity to the bloc, lapsed into inactivity the following
year.

COMECON, founded in January of 1949 in response to the challenge

of the Marshall Plan, may have been intended initially to supplement
Cominform as a formal link in the system.

After the initial meetings

of 1949 and 1950, however, COMECON remained dormant until its revival
in the late 1950s.
While the reasons for COMECON!s early failure will require
elaboration in a subsequent section, it may be said at the outset
that a major factor was Stalin1s preference for indirect methods of
control in the alliance.

In the Stalinist system, the only
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significant formal ties among member states were the bilateral
treaties signed between 1947 and 1952.^

While the treaties formally

guaranteed the sovereignty of the People1s Democracies, they also
formally prohibited the East European states from entering into
alliances opposed by the Soviet Union.

On balance, however, the

treaties were significant more for what they obscured than for what
they revealed about the Stalinist system.
Following the expulsion of Yugoslavia from Cominform in
1948, Stalin made it clear that "domesticism" would no longer be
tolerated in Eastern Europe.^5

Strict adherence to the Soviet

line was achieved through a variety of means, including frequent
consultations among top leaders, direct participation by Soviet
ambassadors in East European domestic affairs, the threat of the
Soviet army, and, above all, by the imposition of leaders trusted
by Stalin.

By 1953, each of the East European leaders had been

personally approved by Stalin by virtue of previous Comintern service
or on the basis of their successful employment of Stalinist methods
within their own Parties.
Stalin himself, of course, constituted the most important link

24For a more detailed analysis, see Zbigniew K. Brzezinski,
The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts:"
Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 107-12.
25For a discussion of the term and its implications for bloc
affairs, see ibid., pp. 51-58, 67-83.
"Domesticism," in the strictest sense, refers to the pre
occupation of East European leaders with domestic problems at the
expense of the broader international goals of the Communist movement.
In a more general sense, the term refers to manifestations of differing
interpretations of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.
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in the system.

As the successful builder of socialism in the Soviet

Union and as the creator of the socialist system in Eastern Europe,.
Stalin embodied the very direct source of legitimacy of the East
European leaders and of the systems they had erected.

The Stalinist

system, successful as it was for the purposes of revolutionary social
and political transformation, did not include the kind of cohesive
elements which could endure.

No stable framework existed for the

containment of conflicts within the system; and basic economic,
political, and military integration had been abandoned in favor of
direct personal rule.
Stalinfs immediate legacy was a period of semiparalysis, both
in the Soviet Union and in the bloc.

Since all elements of Stalin's

rule had been personal, his heirs were left with the task of
reconstructing the bases for stability and cohesion.

During the

years immediately following Stalin's death in March of 1953,
developments in Eastern Europe largely reflected the upheavals going
on within the Soviet Union.

The long-term impact of those develop

ments, however, is still being felt.
The internal crisis in the Soviet Union culminated with
Khrushchev's "secret speech" to the Twentieth Party Congress, in which
he vigorously denounced Stalin and his methods.

In the East European

states, a denunciation of Stalin could only be interpreted as a
denunciation of the "little Stalins" in power throughout the bloc.
While Khrushchev was undoubtedly motivated by concerns for consoli
dating power domestically, he must have been aware of the catastrophic
impact the speech would have in Eastern Europe.

On balance, it
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appears that Khrushchev's aim was to reshape the Stalinist legacy
both in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe.

In any case, the

upheavals in Hungary and in Poland bore witness to the failure of
the new Soviet leadership to successfully transform the Stalinist
system it had inherited.

The Hungarian and Polish "Octobers"
Stalin was replaced in the Soviet Union by an unstable
collective leadership headed by Georgi Malenkov, who, in the face
of conflicting domestic pressures, announced a "new course" for the
Soviet economy.

Encouraged by the easing of world tensions following

the Korean armistice, Malenkov apparently hoped to enhance the
viability of the Soviet regime (and of the regimes of Eastern
Europe) by redirecting the economy toward the production of more
consumer goods.
The two principles of the Malenkov period, collective
leadership politically and the New Course economically, had an
immediate impact on the alliance system.

Alterations in the Soviet

model, still of profound importance to the system, in 1953 were
duplicated with knee-jerk rapidity in the states of Eastern Europe.
The Stalinist assertion that Soviet interpretations of the correct
path to socialism "are binding upon all countries"^6 had been
challenged only by Yugoslavia, and the political realities of the day
dictated that no further challenge would be tolerated.

The erratic

^Bolshevik. No. 17 (1948), as cited by Brzezinski, The
Soviet Bloc, p. 77.
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course followed in Moscow after 1953, however, served to upset the
monolithic quality of the alliance.
In most cases, the Malenkov reforms were adopted in Eastern
Europe without serious political strains.

The New Course, only the

first of what was to be a series of measures toward economic reform,
was adopted in varying degrees.

The principle of collective leader

ship, which meant in effect that the posts of Premier and First
Secretary would not be held by one man, had a serious impact only
in Hungary.
The principal recipient of Soviet accusations of economic
excesses in Hungary was Matyas Rakosi, the Moscow-trained First
Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party.

Accordingly, the New

Course in Hungary was conceived and announced by Imre Nagy, who had
assumed the post of Premier in keeping with the principle of
collective leadership.

It seems clear that either Rakosi or Nagy

alone might have been able to implement the plan without crisis-Rakosi through the continued use of Stalinist methods and Nagy by
a partial liberalization of domestic policies.

The combination of

the two, however, coupled with the erratic policies emanating from
Moscow, set in motion conflicts which could not easily be resolved.
The reversal of the Soviet New Course following Khrushchev*s
elevation to the Premiership in 1954 seemed to constitute an implicit
endorsement of Rakosi.

Before Rakosi was able to consolidate power,

however, his position was hopelessly undercut by Khrushchev*s
de-Stalinization speech.

Neither Rakosi's compromise plan nor the

short-lived Gero government was able to stem the tide of reform which
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began in 1953.

Nagy, who had systematically been forced into a

position of strict national communism, was appointed Premier on
October 23, 1956.

The well-known events of October and early

November, 1956, ended in the Soviet liquidation of the Nagy government.
While the events in Hungary can scarcely be said to be
representative of developments elsewhere in Eastern Europe, they are
instructive in that all of the potentially disruptive elements at
work in the system converged at once.

Hungary, which had endured

one of the most repressive Stalinist regimes, was particularly
ill-prepared in 1953 to sustain erratic tampering with the sources
of political authority.

Encouraged by the course of events in
tr

Poland, dissident groups in Hungary began to press for far-reaching
domestic reform.

Once the previous source of governmental legitimacy—

Stalin--had been repudiated, the leadership was forced to turn
inward to erect a new basis for legitimacy.

That this search took

on a decidedly anti-Soviet tone wa.s symptomatic of the forces at
work within the alliance system.
When the Soviet army intervened in Hungary on October 24
and again on November 4, it did so in clear violation of Articles
1 and 8 of the recently signed Warsaw Pact.

If Khrushchev had hoped

that the Warsaw Treaty Organization would assist in containing
crises within the system, his hopes were not realized in 1956.

While

the Treaty was mentioned as one of the many justifications for the
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Soviet action,27 the Warsaw Treaty Organization never specifically
endorsed the intervention, nor did it respond to Nagy's accusation
that the Pact had been violated.

Despite its inaction— or perhaps

because of it--the Warsaw Pact continued to figure highly in
Khrushchev's plans for a restructured alliance system.
It should be noted that each of the East European Communist
regimes, including the Yugoslav regime, did unilaterally endorse
the intervention.

In addition to the ideological implications of

the possibility of a Communist state "going neutral," the developments
in Hungary posed a clear threat to the maintenance of Party control
elsewhere in the bloc.

With the possible exception of Gomulka in

Poland, it is clear that none of the East European leaders was
reluctant to .endorse the Soviet action, and it is likely that most
welcomed the added measure of political security.
The same forces at work in Hungary revealed themselves in
somewhat different form in Poland, though with quite different
results.

The death of Stalin, the early experimentation of Malenkov,

and particularly the Soviet criticism of the activities of the secret
police all served to set off a wave of criticism and reevaluation *
in Poland.

The defection of a high ranking Polish secret police

officer and his subsequent revelations about the police activities
in Poland contributed to growing public resentment of the role of
the Party in Polish society.

What began with the questioning of some

27The various justifications for the invasion are discussed
in Andrzej Korbonski, "The Warsaw Pact," International Conciliation,
no. 573 (May 1969), p. 24.
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Stalinist practices quickly spread to unprecedented official question
ing of the role of the parliament, the viability of economic programs,
and the methods of the Politburo.
In the wake of workers1 riots in Poznan and increasing
domestic dissent, the Polish leadership became increasingly divided.
The* principal issues dividing the two factions seem to have been
domestic policies, Poland’s relationship to the Soviet Union, and
the position of Wladyslaw Gomulka, who had been imprisoned in 1948
for advocating the "Polish road to socialism."

Events came to a

head when the Polish army refused to act to suppress a second
workers* riot on October 18, 1956.
The following day, a Soviet delegation arrived uninvited
in Warsaw to discuss the situation.

It is apparent that the Soviet

leaders came to realize that developments in Poland had gone beyond
the point where the domestic crisis in Poland could be resolved on
Soviet terms.

For a number of reasons the Soviet delegation, like

the Polish leadership, had come to realize that Gomulka alone could
resolve the domestic conflicts in Poland without seriously damaging
Soviet-Polish relations.

With a wide mandate to pursue a separate

course toward viability in Poland, Gomulka emerged from the crisis
as the symbol of renewal.
The Soviet response to the events in Poland represented a
new willingness on the part of the Soviet leadership to recognize
the existence and validity of differences among the states of Eastern
Europe.

This new orientation was made explicit in the following

excerpt from a Soviet declaration of October 30, 1956:
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The process of establishing the new system and implementing
far-reaching revolutionary reforms of social relationships was
attended by no small number of difficulties, unsolved problems
and outright mistakes, which extended also to relations between
the socialist countries. . . . The Twentieth Congress declared
that full account must be taken of the
historical past and speci0 0
fic features of each country. . . . 0
The break with the past was, on the surface at least, complete.
Stalin had been denounced, past mistakes had been admitted, and the
possibility of separate roads to socialism had been acknowledged.
Throughout the bloc surviving Stalinist leaderships responded to
demands for domestic reform through largely repressive methods.
Nowhere, however, did the patterns of domestic control retain the
authoritarian hold exercised before 1956.

The task which remained

was to replace the discredited Stalinist system with a framework
which could restore a measure of cohesion to the alliance.

Toward a New Cohesion
The cohesion Khrushchev sought was one based on a more
complex and resilient pattern of interrelationships among the
socialist states.

Specifically, he saw the Warsaw Treaty Organization

and COMECON as the basic elements of a new and viable alliance.
The first task, however, was to reestablish the ideological founda
tions of the socialist system, which had been termed "polycentric”
by Italian Communist Party leader Palmiro Togliatti as early as

OQ

^ “Declaration by the Soviet Government on Principles of
Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship Between the Soviet
Union and Other Socialist States,’ October 30, 1956,” in International
Relations Among Communists, ed. Robert H. McNeal (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Publishing Co., 1967), p. 92.
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June of 1956.29
Clearly, the events of 1956 had raised a number of questions
which had not been satisfactorily resolved.

The issues of greatest

importance were the definition of the "correct” road to socialism,
the historical meaning of Stalin and Stalinism, and the position of
the Soviet Union in the socialist system.

Following a series of

bilateral and multilateral meetings among top party leaders, a
conference of representatives of all the Communist countries met in
Moscow in November of 1957.

The conference declaration, which was

signed by the representatives of all the Communist countries except
Yugoslavia, warned against both dogmatism and revisionism and affinned
the leading role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).^O
As a consequence of the absence of any institutional framework
for the resolution of ideological differences,^ the pattern of 1957
was repeated in subsequent ideological conferences.

The 1960

meeting reaffirmed the "vanguard" position of the CPSU, but at. the
1965 and subsequent conferences no special precedence was accorded
the Soviet Union.

In fact, it could be said that the development of

more elaborate interstate relations was paralleled by the gradual

29”Togliatti1s Speech on *Polycentrism* to the Central
Committee of the Italian Communist Party, June 24, 1956," in
International Relations Among Communists, ed. Robert H. McNeal
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Publishing C o ., 1967),
pp. 87-90.
^^"Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of
Communist and Workers* Parties of Socialist Countries, November 22,
1957," in International Relations Among Communists, ed. Robert H.
McNeal (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Publishing Co.,
1967), pp. 98-101.
•^Cominform was officially dissolved April 17, 1956.
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deterioration of interparty relations.^2

Nevertheless, the newly

acknowledged principles of "complete equality" and "state indepen
dence" had established the basis for a new system.
Founded in May of 1955, the Warsaw Treaty Organization
represented the first institutionalized expression of the new form
of relations in the system.

For the first five years of its

existence the WTO, like COMECON in its early years, was little more
than a shell for the future development of an integrative framework.
As a political and military counterweight to NATO, the WTO did prove
useful during the Geneva Conference as a symbol of unity in Eastern
Europe.

WTO also proved useful as a forum for the announcement

of such decisions as troop reductions in Eastern Europe and the
removal of Soviet troops from Rumania.

It was not until 1961,

however, that any serious steps were taken toward military integration
in the bloc; and until the late 1960s it was difficult to discern
any WTO defense policy which amounted to anything beyond a simple
extension of the Soviet defense system.

As for WT0*s activity as

an agency for political integration, there is little evidence to
suggest that until the 1970s the organization functioned as a genuine
forum for political consultation.
Nevertheless, the Warsaw Treaty Organization has served a
number of functions.

First, as has already been mentioned, it

^This argument is developed by Nish Jamgotch, Jr., in
Soviet--East European Dialogue: International Relations of a New
Type? (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1968),
pp. 89-126.
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provided at least the beginnings of a unified East European defense
command.

Second, it provided an additional legal basis for the

continued presence of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe.

While such

justification was probably not essential, it was in keeping with the
new Soviet emphasis on "socialist legality" in both domestic and
foreign policies.
The third principal function of WTO has been its use as a
means of replacing the dysfunctional Stalinist control devices with
a new framework for the tightening of Soviet military control in
Eastern Europe.

With the departure of such direct Soviet military

officials as Konstantin Rokossovsky, who had been the Minister of
Defense in Poland, it became increasingly obvious that a less visible
form of Soviet control was necessary.

Additionally, the refusal of

Polish troops to repress the workers' riots in October, 1956, must
have confirmed Soviet fears about the reliability of the national
armed forces in Eastern Europe.

While the extent of Soviet control

over the East European military has become a matter of some dispute,^3
it is undeniable that the WTO has been the principal agent of efforts
toward tighter Soviet control.
Perhaps the greatest significance of the WTO, however, is
its existence as a formal body for the possible development of
integrative links in the future.

While little is known about the

workings of the Consultative Committee and its auxiliary bodies, it

33por a more complete analysis, see Robin Alison Remington,
The Warsaw Pact (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1971),
pp. 19-23.
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is clear that the important political decisions have been made outside
of the formal framework.

The fact that the realities of the opera

tions of the organization has not reflected its formal constitution,
however, should not obscure the importance of WTO's potential for
the development of a viable integrative framework in the future.
The second pillar of the emerging system, COMECON, was
clearly anachronistic at its inception.

It is obvious now, and it

must have been obvious to Stalin in 1949, that the local requirements
of rapid industrialization were incompatible with regional economic
integration and coordination of national trade.

It may be true

that the original purposes of COMECON were related to immediate
needs, such as preventing Poland and Czechoslovakia from partici
pating in the Marshall Plan or establishing a forum for the
coordination of national economic plans.

On balance, however,

Stalin*s establishment of COMECON seems to have been motivated by
an awareness of the inadequacy of the integrative links in Eastern
Europe and by a desire to initiate a framework for the future
development of economic integration in the system.
In any case, COMECON remained inactive from 1950 until after
Stalin*s death, and its Charter was not signed until 1960.

COMECON

activity increased in 1954, as the Council met four times between
1954 and 1956 to discuss problems of coordination of national plans
and economic specialization.

The creation of nine Standing Commissions
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in 1956^4 provided the first permanent framework for the discussion
of problems related to specific fields of activity.

More importantly,

the Standing Commissions, which had grown in number to twenty-one
by 1962, established a base for the future expansion of COMECON
activities.
COMECON*s institutional framework, like that of the WTO,
consists of organs with vaguely defined powers.

The Standing

Commissions and the COMECON Council are empowered to make recommenda
tions, but in no cases are their decisions binding on the member
states.

As in the case of a Soviet administrative agency, COMECON*s

structure is designed to conceal rather than to specify the nature
of the decision-making process.

Perhaps in response to the growing

success of economic integration in Western Europe, the decision was
made in the early 1960s to upgrade the integrative activities of
COMECON.
The COMECON declaration on "Basic Principles of the
International Socialist Division of Labor,*' signed on June 7, 1962,
represented the first serious step toward economic integration in
Eastern Europe.

The principal objectives of the new program,

improved coordination of national economic development and restructured
patterns of economic exchanges among members, were to be achieved
through the COMECON Executive Committee, which was created in 1962 to

3^The original Standing Commissions were concerned with oil and
gas, coal, electricity, ferrous metallurgy, chemicals, machine build
ing, agriculture, foreign trade, and atomic research.
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act as a genuine supranational body. 35

As was made clear in a subse

quent article by Chairman Khrushchev, the ultimate goal of the pro
gram was that of "building the socialist world economy into a single
entity
By July of 1963, however, Khrushchev had abandoned his
ambitious

p l a n . 37

Opposition to the Basic Principles program was

directed toward two specific concerns.

First, the contemplated

program for the division of labor would have meant, in effect, that
the less developed bloc members would be relegated to a status of
suppliers of raw materials and agricultural products.

Such a

program was clearly incompatible with the domestic and ideological
requirement of rapid industrialization.

Second, the planned creation

of a supranational agency, which doubtless would have been constituted
in such a way as to ensure Soviet predominance, was viewed as a
violation of the principle of national sovereignty so recently
articulated by Chairman Khrushchev.

Arguing against the creation of

a "single planning body," the Rumanian Worker’s Party issued a
statement declaring that "the planned management of the national

^ F o r an analysis of the origins of the Executive Committee,
see Andrzej Korbonski, "The Evolution of COMECON," in International
Political Communities : An Anthology. Anchor Books
(Garden City,
New Jersey: Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 359-67.
36Nikita S. Khrushchev, "Vital Questions of the Development
of the Socialist World System," World Marxist Review 5 (September,
1962):9.
37For an analysis of the reasons for Khrushchev's decision,
see Jamgotch, Soviet--East European Dialogue, pp. 79-88.
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economy is one of the . . . inalienable attributes of the sovereignty
of the socialist state."38

Similar reservations were expressed by

Hungary and Poland.
Despite the failure of the attempt to integrate "from the
top down," substantial success was achieved through more limited
bilateral and multilateral projects.

The number of Standing

Commissions continued to increase through the 1960s, and a number
of bilateral treaties were signed to facilitate the gradual
coordination of national plans.

Additionally, a number of joint

production plans, such as the "Friendship" pipeline and an integrated
power grid, were adopted.

It was not until 1971, however, that

another attempt was made to promote large-scale integration.
The failure of the 1962 program revealed the existence of
a number of factors militating against successful economic inte
gration. In the wake of the de-Stalinization campaign, leaders in
Eastern Europe had been forced to emphasize national considerations
in order to restore authority, and they were understandably reluctant
to submit to any supranational planning body.

Even in an abstract

sense, economic integration among countries with centrally planned
economies presents a number of

p r o b l e m s .
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xhe difficulties of

“^"Statement on the Stand of the Rumanian Worker’s Party
Concerning the Problems of the World Communist and Working Class
Movement, April 22, 1964," in International Relations Among Communists,
ed. Robert H. McNeal (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall
Publishing Co., 1967), p. 128.
39j?or a more complete analysis of the problems of integration
in the bloc, see Jozef M. P. van Brabant, Essays on Planning in
Eastern Europe. (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1974), pp. 7-42.
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introducing uncertain external market forces into a planned economy
could probably be surmounted only through the activities of a
supranational agency.

Such an agency would be supported in Eastern

Europe only if it were so constituted as to ensure equal participa
tion among members.

While economic integration on equal terms

remains a possible development for the future, genuine integration
is not likely so long as Soviet and East European leaders continue
to differ as to its basic constitution.

The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Split -*
The failure of the 1962 economic plan was only one manifes
tation of the growing disunity in the alliance.

Even before the

Sino-Soviet split had escalated to the point of open enmity, the
very success of the Chinese experiment represented a challenge to
Soviet domination in the Communist movement.

The Chinese announce

m e n t ^ in 1958 that China was on the threshold of Communism
strengthened the position of those who argued in favor of "many roads
to socialism."

For the surviving "little Stalins" in Eastern

Europe, Maoism provided an attractive alternate source of legitimacy.
The impact of the Sino-Soviet split on Eastern Europe has
been largely indirect.

Aside from the special case of Albania, only

in Bulgaria, which briefly attempted its own "Great Leap Forward,"
were Chinese domestic policies directly adopted.

The indirect

40’’Concerning the Creation of the People’s Communes in the
Village," Jen Min Jih Pao. September 10, 1958, as cited by
Brezezinski, The Soviet Bloc, p. 370.

36

impact of the split, however, has been profound.

Not only did the

manifestation of "polycentrism*1 further weaken ideological unity in
the bloc, but the Soviet preoccupation with the Chinese challenge
provided the East European leaders with increased latitude to
pursue independent policies.
The East European country‘most directly influenced by China
was, of course, Albania.

Guided primarily by fears of Yugoslav

domination and concern for consolidation of power domestically,
the Albanian leaders came to look to China as a source of external
support.

At the same time, Albania, which had never reversed its

course of domestic Stalinism, came under increasing attack from the
Soviet Union, particularly during the CPSU Twenty-second Congress.
As early as 1960 Albanian leaders accused the Soviet Union of
attempting to exclude Albania from the Warsaw Pact.^

By 1961

the Soviet Ambassador had left Albania, and by 1962 Albania-was
de facto excluded from the alliance system.

/o

In terms of the

alliance as a whole, the impact of Albania*s exclusion was minimal.
On balance it would seem that Albania*s participation in the system,
never of vital importance, was by 1962 more a liability than an
asset.
Of far greater significance to the system was the growing

^ B B C (British Broadcasting Corporation) Summary of Hoxha's
Speech to the November, 1960, Moscow Conference of Communist Parties,
as cited by Remington, The Warsaw Pact, p. 49.
^Albania formally withdrew from WTO in 1968 and continues
to be a nonparticipating member of COMECON.
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independence of Rumania.

Rumania*s geographic proximity to the Soviet

Union and its economic backwardness should have made it a "safe*1 ally
from the Soviet point of view.

Yet by maintaining firm domestic

control and by adopting a neutral position in the Sino-Soviet
dispute, Rumania was able to exploit its own weakness to expand its
room for maneuver within the alliance.
In April of 1958 a joint Sino-Rumanian statement called for
the removal of "armed forces stationed on foreign territory.
While the subsequent Soviet decision to withdraw its troops from
Rumania may not have been a direct consequence of the joint demands,
it is likely that a major factor was the Soviet desire to minimize
Chinese influence in Eastern Europe through a gesture of accommodation.
In any case, Rumania continued to be the principal beneficiary of
the Sino-Soviet dispute.
By 1963 Khrushchev was firmly committed to isolating the
People’s Republic both organizationally and ideologically.

The

1962 COMECON plan and the initiation of joint WTO military maneuvers
in 1961 were both conceived*with the Chinese problem in mind.

Not

surprisingly, the principal opposition to both endeavors came from
the Chinese and the Rumanians.

Throughout 1963 and 1964 Khrushchev

attempted in vain to gather sufficient support in Eastern Europe to
convene an international conference in which the Chinese would be
denounced and the Soviet Union acclaimed the leader of the

^3'*Sino-Rumanian Joint Statement," April 14, 1958, as cited
by Remington, The Warsaw Pact, p. 62.
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international Communist movement.

His failure, due in part to

Rumania’s assumption of the role of mediator in the Sino-Soviet
dispute, was the final blow to his hopes for unity in the alliance.
By 1964, it was clear that Khrushchev*s policies had escalated
the Sino-Soviet dispute without improving the Soviet position in
Eastern Europe.

His position already weakened by a number of other

setbacks, Khrushchev was replaced in October of 1964 by the collec
tive leadership of Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin.

The first

order of business of the new Soviet leadership was to reverse the
deteriorating situation in Eastern Europe.

In light of the continuing

divisions in COMECON, efforts toward improving economic relations
were confined to fostering bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
By the time of the Warsaw Pact’s tenth anniversary, it was clear
that the major efforts of the new leadership would be in the
direction of expanded military integration.
Joint WTO military maneuvers had been held on a regular
basis since 1961, and the practice of placing East European military
leaders in command of certain exercises had been followed since 1962.
Though the precise nature of the WTO integrated command structure is
not known, it is certain that the Soviet Union plays the dominant
role.

The most explicit condemnation of Soviet, influence in WTO

was made in July of 1968 by a Czech Lieutenant General, who
asserted that the joint command is formed by "marshals, generals,
and officers of the Soviet army and that the other member armies
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have only their representatives in this joint command."44

Soviet

officers, holding the titles of Members of Joint Supreme Command of
the Warsaw Pact Forces, are known to play active roles in the national
armed forces of WTO members.

While Soviet motives regarding the

integrated command are clear enough, the extent of Soviet influence
should not be exaggerated.

Strong nationalist factions continue

to exist, particularly in the Polish and Rumanian armies; and
Bulgaria officially reported an attempted coup by a nationalist
AC

faction within the Bulgarian army in 1965.
In any case, Brezhnevfs efforts toward "further perfecting
the Warsaw Treaty Organization11^
Europe, particularly from Rumania.

met with some opposition in Eastern
In 1966 Rumania repeated, in

a strongly anti-Soviet context, an earlier call for the liquidation
of all military blocs.

The alliance was rapidly becoming polarized

over the issue of the Warsaw Pact and its relationship to the West.
Rumania’s policies were viewed with increasing concern, especially
in East Germany, which continued to view the WTO as vital to its
political security.

44nReport on Press Conference with Lieutenant General Vaclav
Prchlik, Head of the State Administrative Section of the
Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee," July 15, 1968, in
Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis, ed.
Robin Alison Remington (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1969),
p. 218.
45por an analysis of military integration in the bloc, see
Korbonski, "The Warsaw Pact," pp. 36-37.
46Brezhnev*s Speech to the Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship
Rally, Pravda, September 16, 1965, as cited by Remington, The
Warsaw Pact, p. 83.
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During the same period, Rumania began to see cooperation
with the West as a means of loosening the Soviet hold in Eastern
Europe.

Having led the drive for a pan-European conference on

security and cooperation the previous year, Rumania exchanged
recognition with West Germany in 1967.

The establishment of

Rumanian— West German diplomatic relations was seen a’s a direct
threat, not only to the security of the northern states of the
alliance, but to the Pact itself, established initially as a
defensive measure against West German revanchism.
The disunity resulting from Rumanian policies was undoubtedly
high on the agenda at the international Communist conference held
in Karlovy Vary in 1967.

Although a measure of unity was evident

in the conference resolution, Rumania--having refused to attend
the conference— was not among the signatories.

There was little

time left to restore unity in the alliance, however, for by 1967
attention was being turned to developments of more immediate concern
in Czechoslovakia.

The Prague Spring and Its Aftermath
A major legacy of the Khrushchev years was a wave of domestic
economic reform in Eastern Europe.

Enunciated in the Soviet Union

in 1962, the reforms were adopted with various results in Eastern
Europe in the mid 1960s.

The Soviet reforms, designed to modify

the archaic Stalinist bureaucratic system, included the granting
of partial autonomy to individual enterprises, the use of economic
incentives to stimulate production, and the creation of a rotation
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system among Party and state officials.

The reforms were gradually

phased out in the Soviet Union, but not before they had an impact
in Eastern Europe.
The reforms, often termed the New Economic Mechanisms (NEM) ,
were adopted in most cases without serious problems.

Hungary and

East Germany achieved substantial success with their NEM, though
East Germany gradually reversed some of the reforms for fear of
a possible liberalizing effect on East German society.

In Rumania

and Bulgaria, the reforms were initiated with little enthusiasm
and later phased out.

Initially repressed in Poland, reforms were

gradually implemented following the riots of 1968 and 1970.
The developments in Czechoslovakia, in many respects
reminiscent of Hungary's experience with the New Course, led to
a political crisis.

The Czech leader, Antonin Novotny, responded

to the initial wave of reform in Eastern Europe by going on a
neo-Stalinist offensive.

Novotny's repressive measures, aggravated

by a full-scale economic slump in 1962-1963, led to growing domestic
criticism among intellectuals and economists.

Supported by an

increasingly vocal group of dissidents, economists denounced the
"cult of the plan" as a version of the discredited "cult of
personality.
The economic reforms, finally adopted in 1966, were imple
mented in an atmosphere of domestic chaos.

As was the case in Hungary

^ F o r a summary of the program announced by Czechoslovak
Professor Ota Sik, see Remington, Winter in Prague: Documents on
Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis, pp. 32-36.
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in 1956, the leadership became critically divided between those who
demanded reform and those who were committed to the Novotny
government.

To the already serious situation was added the issue

of Slovak nationalism.

The Slovak Party, led by Alexander Dubcek,

.vigorously supported reform of the centralized political system
which had been dominated by Czechs.
In October of 1967, brutal police repression of student
demonstrations served to unite the factions opposed to Novotny's
rule.

Unable to maintain support in the Central Committee and unable

to secure Soviet endorsement of his position, Novotny was replaced
by Dubcek as Party First Secretary.

Though obviously committed

to domestic reform, Dubcek never seemed fully in command of the
situation.

By the time of the hastily conceived Party Action

Program, which would have guaranteed democratic elections in the
Party and which would have dramatically liberalized domestic policies,
events in Czechoslovakia were being viewed with great concern in
Eastern Europe.
Clearly, any basic change in the nature of Party rule in
Czechoslovakia had profound implications for the political security
elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

While the Dubcek government never

attempted to pursue the kind of neutralist policy asserted by
Hungary in 1956, its policies were viewed as a direct threat to the
alliance.

Though later justifications for intervention would

include mention of Czech collaboration with West Germany, the central
issue was the course of domestic and political reform in
Czechoslovakia.
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The first bloc attempt to contain the Czech crisis was the
Dresden meeting in March, a meeting which Rumania characteristically
refused to attend.

In May, Warsaw Pact forces conducted joint

exercises in Poland, near the Czech border.

The next exercises,

held in June on Czech territory and followed by a long delay in the
withdrawal of WTO troops, were obviously intended as a warning to
the Dubcek government.

Heeding the warning, Czech leaders met with

a Soviet delegation in Cierna and again in Bratislava during July
and August.

Less than three weeks after the apparent compromise

at Bratislava, however, the Soviet Union and four Warsaw Pact
allies— East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria--invaded
Czechoslovakia.
The invasion was as disastrous politically as it was
successful militarily.
to produce the loyal

Not only did the Warsaw Pact forces fail

comrades

they ostensibly had come to assist,

but they failed to persuade Svoboda, who had replaced Novotny
as President, to form a new government.

Ultimately, the Soviet

Union was forced to accept DubcekTs continued leadership until his
final ouster the following April.
Throughout the conflict, Rumania had refused to participate
in Warsaw Pact activities.

Despite Rumania's exposed position,

President Ceausescu vigorously denounced the Pact's interference
in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia.

In order to erase any

doubts about Rumania's determination, Ceausescu activated the
People's Militia and announced his intention to respond with force to
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any violation of the Rumanian border. °

Rumania was far from alone

in its condemnation of the intervention.

Aside from the countries

which actually participated in the intervention, virtually every
Communist party, whether in power or out, echoed the Rumanian
denunciation.
The official Soviet justification for the intervention was
an appeal by an unidentified group of members of the Czechoslovak
Communist Party Central Committee. 49

The subsequent theoretical

justification made it clear that the Soviet Union considered the
defense of socialism, as defined and interpreted by the Soviet
Union, to be its international right and duty.

It is interesting

to note that this justification, which has become known as the
Brezhnev Doctrine * did not mention the Warsaw Pact or its role in
the invasion.

Only through oblique reference to the threat of West

German revanchism was the Warsaw Treaty used as an explicit justifi
cation for the action.
Despite the fact that the 1968 crisis eventually led to the
use of force, it should be noted that the alliance system was able
to demonstrate considerably more flexibility than it did in 1956.
Unlike the unilateral invasion of 1956, the Czechoslovak invasion
was conducted by five members of the WTO after extensive consultation.

AO

^ Scinteia. August 21, 1968, as cited by Remington, The
Warsaw Pact, p. 107.
49nAppeal by Group of Members of CCP Central Committee and
CSR Government and National Assembly,11 Pravda, August 22, 1968, as
translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 20, September
' 11, 1968, pp. 3-5.
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Had the Czechoslovak leadership heeded the warnings implicit in the
May and June maneuvers, it is even conceivable that the use of force
could have been averted.

The fact that the crisis did result in the

use of force, however, was an indication of a need for a comprehensive
integrationist program.

Such a program was to be an essential part

of Soviet policies toward Eastern Europe after 1968.

CHAPTER II

AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT

The events of 1968 bore witness to the failure of East
European integration as conceived by Nikita Khrushchev a decade
earlier.

Although the joint participation of the Warsaw Pact allies

bestowed a degree of legitimacy to the intervention, the fact that
coercion became necessary betrayed the insufficiency of the inte
grative mechanisms in the system.
the experience:

Two major lessons emerged from

that the failure to construct a viable framework

for consultation and coordination had allowed events in
Czechoslovakia to exceed acceptable limits, and that the failure
to achieve basic economic integration had denied the Soviet Union
and its allies the possibility of bringing economic sanctions to
bear on its wayward ally.
Clearly, the alliance system of 1968 was a considerably
more flexible and sophisticated one than that which had existed
under Stalin.

An institutional framework had been constructed on

the basis of state sovereignty, and, within certain vaguely defined
limits, pluralistic tendencies within the alliance had been tolerated
and even accommodated.

The far-reaching 1962 COMECON integration

program had failed, but substantial success had been achieved through
bilateral and multilateral cooperative ventures.

Finally, military

integration through the WTO served as the basis for growing
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institutionalization of Soviet military control in the bloc.
By the mid 1960s, the evidence of change in the Soviet
bloc had convinced many Western observers that the pattern of direct
Soviet influence had been replaced by a new, more equitable form of
relations.

Writing in 1966, for example, one analyst concluded:

A reversion to the charismatic/terroristic policy of Stalin
or the military interventionism of 1956 is out of the question. . .
The essence of Soviet relations with East Europe is now
negotiation--a process of multilateral and bilateral dealings
with leaderships which, although certainly not equal to the
Soviets in power and prestige, are sufficiently autonomous to
preclude any form of direct Soviet dictation.^
As the events of 1968 demonstrated, however, the Soviet leaders did
return to the pattern of direct dictation, and they did so with the
willing support of most of their Warsaw Pact allies.
Thus, for Western analysts, the intervention of 1968 seemed
to bear out the old dictum, "The more things change, the more they
stay the same."

While many analysts correctly identified the forces

at work in the Soviet bloc, the conclusions they reached were often
based on false assumptions about the process of integration in the
Soviet bloc.

Integration Theories Reconsidered
Perhaps the most widely accepted view among Western observers
during the 1960s was that the forces at work in Eastern Europe were
leading inevitably to the disintegration of the Soviet bloc.

Writing

in 1965, for example, Herbert Dinerstein argued,

“^Stephen S. Anderson, "Soviet Relations with East Europe,"
Current History. October 1966, p. 205.
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. . . it is hard to imagine Eastern Europe as anything but
much altered ten years from now and Western Europe as remaining
essentially the same. Paradoxically, it seems that the cohesion
of the Communist alliance system, once pressed into a rigid mold,
will suffer much greater disintegration than the always loose
noncommunist system.-51
In 1975, ten years after that article appeared, it is difficult to
argue that the Soviet bloc has suffered "much greater disintegration"
than the noncommunist system.
While analyses predicting the dissolution of the Soviet bloc
might have appeared vindicated by the events in Czechoslovakia,
such predictions simply have not been borne out in the years which
have followed.

Not only were the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact

allies able to restore stability in Czechoslovakia through an imposed
leadership, but in the past few years they have demonstrated
substantial cohesion and have embarked on a new drive for integration.
Thus while analyses of "polycentrism" may have accurately assessed
the existence of disruptive elements in the bloc, they failed to
account for the ability of the system to contain disruptions and to
build a new form of stability.
To be sure, many analysts found that the events of 1968
confirmed their convictions about the nature of Soviet intentions
and the persistence of bloc power relationships.

However, there is

a danger of erring in the opposite direction as well, for the
similarity of Soviet actions in 1956 and 1968 should not obscure

^Herbert Dinerstein, "The Transformation of Alliance Systems,"
American Political Science Review 59 (September, 1965):601.
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fundamental changes in the alliance.
Misapprehensions before 1968 concerning Soviet willingness
to resort to coercion were perhaps’defensible, for all the evidence
suggests that the decision to invade was made with great reluctance
on the part of the Soviet leadership.

Those analysts who, in the

mid 1960s, predicted the imminent disintegration of the Soviet bloc,
however, made a more fundamental error, an error which was often due
to reliance on false assumptions concerning the nature of integration
in Eastern Europe.

Specifically, faulty conclusions regarding

East European integration may be seen in terms of three fallacies
of integration theories:

the teleological fallacy, the fallacy of

static analysis, and the fallacy of applying assumptions derived
from the Western experience.
The teleological fallacy is inherent in many of the defini
tions of integration.

Haas, Etzionl, Deutsch, and others have all

defined integration in terms of some posited future condition,
usually political unification, "political community," or a "socialist
commonwealth of nations."52

Thus many analysts have assessed East

European integration only to the extent to which interaction among
the states of Eastern Europe is progressing toward or receding from

S^See, for example, Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 29;
Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1965), p. 329; Karl W. Deutsch and others,
Political Community in the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5; and Leon N.
Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic
Integration (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1963),
p. 6.
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the posited end state.

The point to be made is not that there is

anything inherently wrong with the definitions, but that analyses
based on such definitions have been inadequate for the assessment
of the interaction within the Soviet bloc.
There is, for example, a tendency among Western observers
to view economic integration in the Soviet bloc in terms of efforts
to create a supranational agency of the kind known in the Common
Market.

Developments of the past few years in the Soviet bloc

have shown, however, that substantial integrative links, especially
in terms of import-dependence, have been achieved without the
implementation of a supranational planning body.
The second source of error is that of static analysis:
©

many observers have assessed integration in the alliance in
terms of previous goals, objectives, and functions which may no
longer be relevant.

The problem of static analysis is at once the

most common source of wrong thinking about the Soviet bloc and the
one most difficult to avoid.

If integration is broadly defined in

terms of alliance function, whether officially acknowledged or not,
the problem will always remain of redefining what is meant by
integration.

While such a process sacrifices precision and rigor,

it seems to be an inescapable facet of any valid analysis of the
Soviet bloc.
The problem of static analysis is at the root of faulty
conclusions derived from the hypothesis which holds that as inter
system conflict decreases, intrasystem cohesion decreases.

Applying

the hypothesis to European alliances, several analysts have concluded
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that the reduction of interbloc tension in Europe has contributed to
the disintegration of both blocs.

CO

As regards the Soviet bloc,

such conclusions rest on the assumption that the military threat
from the West, which may well have been a motive for the initial
formation of the alliance, continues to be a major factor in alliance
cohesion.
The basic foundation for this hypothesis is found in the
work of Simmel concerning group behavior.

The essence of Simmers

proposition is that so long as the basic values of a group remain
intact, as out-group pressure decreases, in-group cohesion
d e c r e a s e s . A c c e p t i n g for the sake of argument the validity of
Simmelfs proposition, the question becomes, have the basic values
of the Soviet bloc remained intact?

(Clearly, "basic values"

refers not to Communist ideology, but to "alliance ideology," or
the goals, objectives, and functions of the alliance.)

It seems

clear that "out-group pressure," defined in terms of military threat,
has indeed diminished during the past decade, but it seems equally
clear that the presence or absence of external military threat has
diminished as a source of cohesion in the Soviet bloc.

53See, for example, P. Terrence Hopmann, "The Effects of
International Conflict and Detente on Cohesion in the Communist
System," in The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies, ed.
Roger E. Kanet (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 301-38; and Ole R.
Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and
Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (New
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), pp. 88-148.
5^Georg Simmel, Conflict (New York:
pp. 92-93. [ Emphasis added. ]

Free Press, 1955),
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There are, it seems, two possible conclusions to be made from
the previous discussion.

First, it might be argued that external

conflict, defined in terms of military threat, does not necessarily
have a profound effect on alliance cohesion.

Second, the hypothesis

might prove to be valid--on the condition that "external threat" is
redefined to include external economic and ideological threats.

Both

conclusions appear to have been supported by recent developments in
the Soviet bloc, for with the decrease in military threat from the
West have come new forms of economic and ideological dangers which
have required a new emphasis on alliance cohesion.
The third source of error in studies of Communist systems
results from excessive reliance on assumptions derived from the
Western experience.

At the domestic level, such fallacies are

revealed in the many "convergence" theories.^5

Simply stated,

convergence theorists have argued that similarities between socialist
and Western societies, in terms of industrialization and urbanization,
for example, will lead ultimately to similarities in the nature of
political control.

While such analyses may illustrate the nature

of problems faced by the Soviet and East European leaders, predictions
of convergence simply have not been borne out.

In fairness, it should

be noted that most convergence theorists are well aware of the
limitations of their analyses.

What is intended here is simply to

55por a discussion of the weaknesses of theories of con
vergence, see Alfred G. Meyer, "Theories of Convergence," in Change in
Communist Systems, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 313-41.
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reiterate their own reservations concerning the applicability of the
Western experience to that of the socialist countries.
The Western experience in alliance behavior has produced
similar misapprehensions concerning the nature of the alliance system
in Eastern Europe.

Western preoccupation with parliaments, political

participation, and political development, for example, have led to
certain expectations and predictions which have not been realized
with regard to the Soviet bloc.

When compared to the Western system

of alliances in terms of structural sophistication and the existence
of joint decision-making, the East European alliance is surely
less well developed.

Yet the alliance has, despite its structural

deficiencies, served well its intended functions, which include the
formalization of Soviet control in the bloc, the development of bloc
economies, and the guarantee of a measure of political security
for the regimes in power.
Excessive reliance on Western standards has led observers
to two general conclusions.

First, many have concluded that the

Soviet bloc is not integrated or that it is in a process of
disintegration.The second extreme conclusion, adopted
behavior has not conformed to expectations, is that
is not a "true
or irrelevant:

a l l i a n c e .”^6

when
the Soviet bloc

The first conclusion is either incorrect

incorrect if it refers to the pattern of interaction

in Eastern Europe, and irrelevant if it refers to integration as it

^^Malcolm Mackintosh, ”The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact,”
Adelphi Papers» no. 58 (London, England:
Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1969), p. 18.

54

has been understood in other settings.

The second conclusion simply

begs the question.
The preceding discussion has attempted to show some of the
sources of error in integration theories applied to the Soviet bloc.
If there is a danger of reaching false conclusions regarding the
nature of change in the alliance, however, there is also a danger
of concluding that there has been no change at all.

According to

such a view, it might well be concluded that the invasion of
Czechoslovakia simply confirmed the permanence of Soviet motives and
the immutability of the Soviet bloc power relationship.

The

totalitarian literature of the 1950s and the assessments of the
monolithic quality of the Soviet bloc, for example, implicitly
precluded the analysis of change.

The very terms "totalitarian"

and "monolithic" made it difficult to acknowledge, much less
analyze, change in the alliance.
In summary, to be understood at all, the Soviet bloc must
be understood in terms of its own distinctive functions, structures,
and relationships.

This is not to say that methods of analysis

which have been applied in other settings must necessarily be
inappropriate, nor is it to say that integration must be so narrowly
defined as to apply only to the situation in Eastern Europe.

The

point to be made is that any valid approach must be free of those
assumptions derived from other analyses which are not relevant to
the nature of interaction among the states of the East European
alliance system.
The starting point for analysis of alliance transformation
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must be a definition of integration in terms of the functions it is
to serve and the structures and relations which have been established
to perform those functions.

From that perspective,

to identify the patterns of

change and the patterns

itis necessary
ofcontinuity

in the alliance, to examine the relationships among them, and to
indicate the prospects for alliance change in the near future.

Patterns of Change. Patterns of Continuity
As Morton Kaplan has proposed, integrative processes are
processes which join systems or organizations with separate
institutions and goals within a common framework providing for
the common pursuit of at least some goals and the common
implementation of at least some policies.^7
Integration, in this sense,is not a unidirectional
varies with the goals being

process:

it

pursued at a given time.

In order to assess the nature of integration, it is first
necessary to break down the process into those components which
perform integrative functions.

As part of a conceptual framework

for the study of the integrative process, Philip E. Jacob has
suggested ten "integrative factors":

geographic proximity,

homogeneity, level of transactions, mutual knowledge, functional
interest, communal character, structural frame, sovereignty-dependency
status, governmental effectiveness, and previous integrative

^Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International
Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), p. 98.
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experience.58

By establishing the relationships among the factors

which exert an integrative influence, Jacob argues, it is possible
to assess the progress achieved toward integration.
More important for an analysis of the evolution of the
Soviet bloc, however, is the assessment of the nature of change in
each of the factors and possible impact of change in one factor on
changes in other factors.

While all of the 'factors have the

potential for change, not all of the factors have in fact constituted
elements of change in the bloc.

By assessing the patterns of change

and the patterns of continuity, however, it is possible to indicate
the nature of alliance transformation.
The treatment of the ten lfintegrative factors’1 will be
primarily directed toward the assessment of change in the alliance
from 1956 to 1968.

Since 1968, it will be argued, the patterns of

change and of continuity had been woven into a new pattern of
relationships within the Soviet bloc.
Of Jacob’s ten integrative factors, three--mutual knowledge,
governmental effectiveness, and previous integrative experience--seem
to be of marginal use in the study of the Soviet bloc.

While mutual

knowledge among the alliance leaders has probably increased,
particularly in relation to the turbulent years of 1953 to 1956, it.
would be difficult to argue that any change has had a profound

58philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, ’’The Integrative Process,"
in The Integration of Political Communities, ed. Philip E. Jacob
and James V. Toscano (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964),
pp. 1-45.
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impact on the alliance.

The other two--governmental effectiveness

and previous integrative experience--may be treated together.
Governmental effectiveness refers to the degree to which the
alliance has met the needs and demands of its members, while
previous integrative experience refers to the extent to which
earlier cooperation may contribute to further integration.
cases, the impact has been largely indirect:

In both

the evolution of a

pattern of interaction in the Soviet bloc has led to the emergence
of leaders more or less committed to the existing bloc arrangement.
In this sense, then, all three of the factors cited constitute
elements of continuity in the alliance.
The factors of proximity and homogeneity are two additional
elements of continuity.

In terms of geographic proximity, the only

change in the alliance from 1956 to 1968 was the departure of
Albania from the system.

It need hardly be said that the fact that

alliance members are contiguous constitutes an important integrative
factor in the system, particularly in light of the geopolitical
situation in Europe.
Despite the evidence of "polycentrism” and "domesticism,11
homogeneity remains the most important integrative factor in the
alliance.

As Leonid Brezhnev has repeatedly observed,

There is every objective condition for the cooperation
between Socialist countries to grow increasingly stronger.
Our peoples are united by a community of fundamental
interests. (1) We have an economic foundation of the same
type--the social ownership of the means of production. (2) We
have similar state systems--the power of the people, headed by
the working class. (3) We have a single ideology--MarxismLeninism. (4) We have common interests in insuring security,
in safeguarding the peace and security of the peoples, and in
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defending the revolutionary gains from the encroachments of the
imperialists. [5 ] We have a single great a i m - - c o m m u n i s m . - ^
Of course, the existence of similar economic, political, and social
systems is not sufficient to promote integration:

it is the

combination--of basic homogeneity, shared interests, and the
existence of a core power committed to the maintenance of its
sphere of influence--which contributes to the persistence of
existing bloc relations.
Patterns of change in the alliance may be seen in terms of
the other five integrative factors:

sovereignty-dependency status,

structural frame, functional interest, transactions, and communal
character.

These five correspond closely to the components Samuel

Huntington has suggested for the analysis of change in a political
o
system: groups, structure, leadership, policies, and c \ i l t u r e . 6 0
Jacob's sovereignty-dependency factor corresponds to Huntington's
groups; structural frame corresponds to structure; transactions, to
policies; and communal character,*to culture.
Not included in Jacob's analysis, however, is the leadership
component.

Clearly, the political leadership in Eastern Europe is in

a position to influence the direction of change in the alliance.

On

balance, however, the kind of leadership which might have been

59speech in Moscow at the celebration of the 47th anniversary
of the Bolshevik Revolution, New York Times, November 7, 1964,
p. 8.
6®Samuel P. Huntington, ''The Change to Change: Modernization,
Development, and Politics," Comparative Politics 3 (April 1971):
316-17.
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expected to follow the wave of nationalism in Eastern Europe has not
emerged.

Constrained both by the need to maintain firm party control

and by Soviet determination to have loyal comrades in positions of
leadership throughout the bloc,. East European leaders simply
have not exercised the kind of control envisioned in the totalitarian
models.

Moreover, the kind of influence they have been able to

■v.exercise has generally served as an element of continuity in the
alliance.

The exceptions--Nagy and Dubcek, whose regimes were

quickly terminated, and Ceausescu--merely prove the general validity
of the rule.
The sovereignty-dependency factor taps two dimensions:

the

sovereignty of the alliance as a whole and the sovereignty status
of its component members.

In this latter sense, the extent of Soviet

domination can hardly be exaggerated:

Soviet Gross National Product

(GNP) is more than twice that of the other alliance members combined,
and the Soviet Union continues to play the only significant role in
bloc military affairs.

In terms of national control over the

instruments of force--a basic criterion of national sovereignty-Soviet influence persists.

As Walter Ulbricht has said, "Firm

friendship with the Soviet Union is the law of life for our people
and s t a t e . A t

the very least, the power relationships in the

alliance dictate the limits beyond which any restructuring of the
alliance may not go.

6^-Neues Deutschland. October 23, 1968, as cited by Peter
Bender, East Europe in Search of Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1972), p. 31.
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Nevertheless, important changes have taken place, changes
which have had an impact on the structure of alliance relationships.
By 1968 Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany were, by virtue of
their respective GNPs, significant powers in their own rights; and
East Germany's GNP per capita exceeds that of the Soviet Union.
While the dramatic increase in industrial production in Eastern
Europe has not resulted directly in increased autonomy, it has been
reflected indirectly in terms of expanded influence in bloc affairs,
particularly in bloc trade relations.

Moreover, the Soviet need

for East European finished goods and the signing of long-term trade
agreements have transformed the previous exploitative arrangement
into a more interdependent one.
Beyond these objective factors were a number of subjective
changes reflecting a new sovereignty status in Eastern Europe.

The

de-Stalinization campaign, coupled with growing domestic demands
following the initial revolutionary fervor, resulted in demands for
increased autonomy and the acknowledgment of the legitimacy of
"separate roads to socialism."

In the wake of the crises in Hungary

and Poland in 1956, Khrushchev sought--for the sake of regime
viability and alliance cohesion--to restructure the alliance on the
basis of national sovereignty.

Even when the propaganda motives

of the Khrushchev campaign are considered, it is clear that the
alliance after 1956 was based on a new form of relationships.
The first impact of the change in sovereignty-dependency
status, then, was reflected in the creation of a new structural
9

frame for the alliance.

Though Khrushchev's apparent objective--
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the creation of a supranational agency dominated by the Soviet Union-was never realized, the alliance framework he created served to alter
the nature of bloc relationships and expand the scope of alliance
activities.

Paradoxically, the same forces which prompted attempts

toward the creation of a supranational agency eventually served to
subvert them:

that is, the forces of national self-awareness and

assertiveness, which were to be checked by WTO and COMECON, proved
sufficiently strong to prevent the creation of a supranational
agency.

To repeat a previously cited quotation, the Rumanian

Worker1s Party responded to the 1962 COMECON integration plan by
declaring that "the planned management of the national economy is one
of the . . . inalienable attributes of the sovereignty of the
r O

socialist state."
For any understanding of the interaction among the states
of Eastern Europe, the "structural framework" of the alliance should
be conceived in the broadest sense to include, in addition to WTO
and COMECON, the network of bilateral and multilateral treaties and
agreements, joint production and planning ventures, and the system
of meetings and conferences among top party and government leaders.
By 1968 the states of Eastern Europe were linked through the Warsaw
Pact, COMECON (with its twenty-three permanent commissions), and six

tatement on the Stand of the Rumanian Worker's Party
concerning the Problems of the World Communist and Working Class
Movement, April 22, 1964," in International Relations Among
Communists, ed. Robert H. McNeal (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall Publishing Co., 1967), p. 128.
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other major international

o r g a n i z a t i o n s

.^3

Additionally, a series

of nine bilateral treaties signed in the mid 1960s.served to supple
ment the Warsaw Pact and to replace the expired treaties of the
1940s.

Thus by 1968 the alliance had progressed from the Stalinist

system, characterized by a few formal treaties and a pattern of
direct Soviet influence, to a system in which the East European
industries were linked through joint production arrangements and
in which the national military forces were almost totally committed
to the Warsaw Pact unified command.
Within the new alliance framework, the expanded scope of
bloc activities was reflected in the increase in intrasystem
transactions.

Some analysts have assessed integration in terms of

transaction flows, using such indicators as trade data, communication
flows, and levels of governmental

c o n t a c t s .

^4

As Haas has observed,

however, an increase in transaction levels may either precede, cause,
reinforce, or result from integration.^*-*

For the purpose of analysis,

transactions may be seen as a product of integration, though the
nature of the transactions may stimulate further integration.

The

signing of a trade agreement, for example, may provide for long-term

^Europa Year Book. 1974 (London, England:
Publications, 1974), pp. 102-332.

Europa

64See, for example, Karl W. Deutsch, "Transaction Flows as
Indicators of Political Cohesion," in The Integration of Political
Communities, ed„ Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (Philadelphia:
J. B. Lippincott C o ., 1964), pp. 188-89.
^Ernst B. Haas, "The Challenge of Regionalism,"
International Organization 12 (Autumn 1958):445.
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cooperation, and satisfactory cooperative ventures may have a
“spillover" effect:

that is, they may contribute to cooperation-in

other areas of activity.^6
One area of increased interaction among alliance members was
in the expansion of Warsaw Pact activities from 1956 to 1968.

As

shown in Table 1, the frequency of Warsaw Pact meetings began to
increase in 1961, the same year that joint military maneuvers began
to be held on a regular basis.

Additionally, the level of represen

tation increased dramatically:

where in 1956 the Political

Consultative Committee (PCC) delegations were headed by the chief
or deputy chief of Government of the member states, in 1960 the
delegations were led by the first secretaries of the Communist
parties, and by 1966 some delegations included (in addition to the
first secretary) other members of the Politburo, members of the
chiefs-of-staff, and the ambassador to the Soviet Union.^7
In trade relations, too, the alliance system showed a steady,
if unspectacular, increase in activity.

As illustrated in Table 2,

the total amount of trade within the system increased three-fold, and
the percentage of total trade accounted for by intrasystem trade
remained stable.

While the level of transactions reflected in the

trade data increased substantially, the most profound change was in

66Haas* concept of "spillover" is similar to the doctrine
of "ramification" developed by David Mitrany in "The Functional
Approach to World Organization," International Affairs 24 (July
1948):350-63.
6?Robin Alison Remington, The Warsaw Pact (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 165-98.
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TABLE 1
WARSAW PACT ACTIVITY, 1956 TO 1968

Number of Warsaw
Treaty Organization
meetings

Year

Number of
joint
maneuvers

1956

1

1957

• ♦ •

•

•

•

1958

1

•

•

o

1959

1

•

•

•

1960

1

•

•

•

1961

3

3

1962

2

5

1963

3

2

1964

•

•

• .• •

•

2

1965

5

3

1966

4

2

1967

1

5

1968

7

2

SOURCES :
The Europa Year Book, 1974.
London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1974.
Pp. 410--11.
Korbonski, Andrzej. "The Warsaw
Pact ." International Conciliation, no. 573
(May 1969). Pp. 20-21.

Warsaw Pact.
Press, 1971.

Remington, Robin Alison. The
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT
Pp. xvii-xix.
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TABLE 2
COMECON TRADE DATA, 1956 TO 1968
(Values in Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Total trade

Year

Exports

Trade within COMECON
Percent
age of
total
exports

Imports

(%)
1956

8 440

7 800

4 830

57

1957

9 600

9 380

5 940

62

1958

10 110

9 740

6 060

60

1959

11 990

11 690

7 390

62

1960

12 970

12 920

8 080

62

1961

14 120

13 820

8 970

64

19.62

15 770

15 280

10 170

64

1963

17 000

16 380

11 030

65

1964

18 400

18 100

11 960

65

1965

19 710

18 990

12 460

63

1966

20 910

19 670

15 540

60

1967

22 820

21 100

13 740

60

1968

24 900

13 000

15 240

61

SOURCES:
Statistical Yearbook. 1966. New York:
Table B.

United

Nations, 1967.

Statistical Yearbook. 1973. New York:
Table B.

United

Nations, 1974.
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the nature of the transactions.

The increase in coordination,

specialization, and interdependence is suggested by the expansion
of COMECON Standing Commissions and agencies.

As indicated in Table 3,

by 1962 twenty-one Standing Commissions had been created to deal
with problems of coordination in virtually all areas of economic
activity.

Thus by the end of 1962, of 2,500 kinds of industrial

equipment produced in East Europe, only 300 were produced in more
than one country.68
As the previous discussion has suggested, the most important
manifestation of the increased activity through COMECON has been
not in the level of transactions, but in the qualitatively different
nature of cooperation.

Functional interest, the next of Jacob's

integrative factors, has not only increased but has become more
specialized.

As the states of Eastern Europe gained power, and as

they began to face new domestic problems, they came to expect from
the existing structural framework more specific benefits.

Where the

previous motives for economic cooperation were ostensibly based on
ideological concerns (often expressed in the desire for a simultan
eous leap into socialism) , by the mid 1960s economic cooperation
was based on more explicit economic motivations seen in terms of
national interest.
A major factor promoting functional cooperation through
COMECON has been the need for a cooperative arrangement providing

fi O

S. Jendrychowski, "The Economic Effects of the International
Socialist Division of Labor," World Marxist Review 6 (March
1963):4.
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TABLE 3
COMECON COMMISSIONS AND AFFILIATED
AGENCIES, 1956 TO 1968

Field of activity

Year of
creation

Standing commissions (23)

Coal

1956

Electricity

1956

Oil and gas

1956

Ferrous metallurgy

1956

Nonferrous metallurgy

1956

Chemicals

1956

Machine building

1956

Agriculture

1956

Atomic research

1956

General economic questions

1958

Transportation

1958

Building and construction

1958

Light industry

1958

Atomic energy

1960

Statistics

1962

Coordination of research

1962

Standardization

1962

68

TABLE 3--Cbntinued

Year of
creation

Field of activity

Finance and foreign exchange

1962

Electronics

1962

Geology

1962

Food industry

1962

Water administration

1965

Labor

1968

Agencies (associated committees— 7)

Post, telegraph and telephone (communications)

1957

Druzba pipeline (gas and oil)

1962

Mir powerline (electricity)

1962

Intermetall (ferrous metallurgy)

1964

Ball bearings (machine building)

1964

International bank (finance)

1964

Shipping and freight (transportation)

1965

SOURCES:
The Europa Year Book, 1974. London:
Publications, Ltd., 1974. Pp. 186-87.

Europa

Brabant, Josef M. P. van. Essays on Planning in
Eastern Europe. Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1974.
Pp. 8-16.
Korbonski, Andrzej. "The Evolution of COMECON." In
International Political Communities: An Anthology. Edited by Anchor
Books. Garden City, New Jersey: Anchor Books, 1966. Pp. 367-88.

69

protection from the economic giants of Western Europe.

Moreover,

it has come to be recognized in Eastern Europe that in order to
reach a stage of economic viability, economic cooperation must be
conducted, not on the basis envisioned in the 1962 COMECON Basic
Principles plan, but on the basis of state equality and functional
specialization.
In the Warsaw Treaty Organization as well, substantial,
if less easily discernible, changes in functional interest took
place.

To be sure, two important functions of the organization

have persisted:

namely, its function as an extension of the Soviet

defense command and its function as an instrument of Soviet influence
in Eastern Europe.

With the gradual reduction of the military

threat from the West during the 1960s, however, the WTO began to
serve a less purely military function.

As has been seen, the

nature of the threat from the West is no longer seen in purely
military terms, but in terms of the threat to political security
posed by the expansion of East-West contacts.
The expansion of WTO's political functions has been seen in
the increased emphasis on the Political Consultative Committee.

Not

only has the nature of representation at the PCC demonstrated its
new importance, but the Committee has dealt with problems of an
increasingly political nature.

As several analysts have concluded,

during the 1960s the functions of the Warsaw Pact came to include the
recognition and accommodation of divergent interests, and the
organization began to be used as an agency for conflict resolution
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in the alliance.^9
In summary, the change in sovereignty-dependency status of
the states of Eastern Europe necessitated the creation of a more
flexible and sophisticated alliance structure, and emerging demands
in Eastern Europe led to new forms of transactions and new functional
interests.

Moreover, the patterns of change in the alliance have

led to the evolution of a new communal character, Jacob*s final
integrative factor.
In 1956 the East European alliance system was characterized
by a communal character, or alliance ideology, which included a
number of ambitious, often utopian, goals.

In the broadest sense,

the alliance reflected a commitment to the establishment of
Marxism-Leninism on an international scale.

In terms of military

security, it was committed to the.defense of socialism against the
forces of Western imperialism.

Economic coordination, seen primarily

in ideological terms, was aimed at preparing the states of East
Europe for the simultaneous leap into socialism with the eventual
aim of building "the socialist world economy into a single entity.
During the following decade, however, a number of external
and internal developments had served to alter the character of the
alliance.

The problems which followed the revolutionary social

^See, for example, Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc:
Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1967), pp. 456-512; and Remington, The Warsaw Pact» pp. 165-98.
70Nikita S. Khrushchev, ''Vital Questions of the Development
of the Socialist World System," World Marxist Review 5 (September
1962):9.
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upheavals in Eastern Europe, heightened by the denunciation of Stalin,
diminished the importance of ideology as a cohesive element in the
alliance.

Additionally, the impact of the Sino-Soviet split on

existing polycentric tendencies in Eastern Europe tended to subvert
the grandiose aims of the alliance as it was originally conceived.
Finally, the rapid decline in East-West hostilities served to erode
the original basis of the military arm of the alliance.
As previous threats subsided, however, new ones emerged.
The expansion of East-West trade and the increase in human contacts
presented a potential threat to the regime security of the states
of Eastern Europe, and economic problems in the face of growing
consumer demands presented a threat to economic viability and
political security.

New problems created new motives for integration--

integration based, however, on a new communal character.
Thus by 1968 considerations of military security had given
way to concern for regime security as a cementing element in the
alliance, and ideological aspirations had been, for all intents
and purposes, set aside.

The grandiose objectives of economic

coordination had been abandoned in favor of limited functional
cooperation and specialization based on economic motives and
national priorities.

Moreover, the very essence of interstate

relations had been altered to accommodate divergent views and
interests.

Thus by 1969, an official document from the International

Conference of Communist and Workers1 Parties could assert,
All parties have equal rights. At this time when there
is no leading center of the international communist movement,
voluntary coordination of the actions of parties in order
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effectively to carry out the tasks before them acquires increased
importance.71

71»»Basic Document Adopted by the International Conference
of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, June 17, 1969," Pravda.
June 18, 1969, as translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet
Press 21 (August 1969):24.

CHAPTER III

"SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM" IN THE 1970S

The elements of change and of continuity which evolved during
the 1960s had by the end of that decade been woven into a distinctively
new pattern of interstate relations in Eastern Europe.

In theoretical

literature, the new pattern has been linked to "socialist inter
nationalism" and "international relations of a new type," terms
which date from the early years of the Khrushchev era.^2

Since

1970, however, the terms have received increased attention, and the
new form of interstate relations has been the subject of considerable
7 0

ideological interpretation and justification.'J

The following excerpt

from an article in the Moscow journal International Affairs is
representative of a consistent theme in the Soviet press.
Proletarian internationalism constitutes a basic principle
of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and of the policies of the
communist parties. . . . I n the course of creating and

72see, for example, G. I. Tunkin, "Socialist Internationalism
and International Law," New Times [ Moscow ], October/December, 1957>
p. 10.
73For a development of the terms in relation to MarxistLeninist doctrine, see Jan F. Triska, "The Socialist World System
in Search of a Theory," in The New Communisms, ed. Dan N. Jacobs
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969), pp. 18-46; Nish
Jamgotch, Jr., "Alliance Management in Eastern Europe (The New Type
of International Relations)," World Politics 27 (April, 1975):405-29;
and Nish Jamgotch, Jr., Soviet--East European Dialogue:
International Relations of a New Type? (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 89-104.

73
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consolidating the multinational Soviet state, building socialism
and communism in the USSR and in the process of socialist con
struction in the fraternal countries, for the first time it
became the foundation for the development of inter-state relations
of a new, socialist type. Under socialism, the social base of
proletarian internationalism has immeasurably been extended, and
now has become the state policy of socialist countries. . . .
Thus, socialist internationalism has become the chief principle
of relations among the fraternal countries.74
Like proletarian internationalism, of course, socialist
internationalism is held to be a transitional stage toward the
achievement of Communism on an international scale, justified as being
"the most acceptable and objectively inevitable form of combining
national and international interests, of materially preparing for their
fusion in [ the ]

f u t u r e .

"75

During this transitional stage, it is

argued,
despite the coincidence of basic interests, different
approaches to some questions are not ruled out. . . . Under
socialism, however, unlike the basic contradictions inherent
in capitalist society, they are not antagonistic. °
Like Khrushchev*s 1956 reference to the ''commonwealth of
socialist nations" based on "full equality" and

s o v e r e i g n t y ,
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socialist internationalism represents a distinct departure from the

74b . Kozin, "Socialist Countries: Unity and Cohesion,"
International Affairs [ Moscow ], March 1974, p. 5. [ Emphasis added. ]
75b . Ladygin, "Socialist Internationalism: Fraternity and
Cooperation," International Affairs [ Moscow ], June 1973, p. 10.
76Kozin, "Socialist Countries:

Unity and Cohesion," p. 7.

77MDeclaration by the Soviet Government on 'Principles of
Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation
Between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States,1 October 30,
1956," in International Relations Among Communists, ed. Robert H.
McNeal (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Publishing Co.,
1967), p. 92.
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past.

Not only does it represent a further acknowledgment that the

"fraternal countries" may justifiably exercise independence in inter
state relations, but it suggests that the transitional stage may
be prolonged and will be characterized by "nonantagonistic" contra
dictions.

When taken in context, moreover, references to socialist

internationalism clearly imply a limiting of the term to apply to
78
the East European "core" of the socialist system.
The rhetoric of socialist internationalism should not, of
course, obscure the reality of current alliance relations.

If by

"commonwealth of socialist nations" is meant an association of free
and equal states, it is clear that no such arrangement exists.
Nevertheless, fundamental changes have taken place within the
alliance.

If the Soviet bloc is conceived in terms of a continuum

running from Stalinist cohesion to a socialist commonwealth, for
example, it is clear that the alliance has moved a long way from the
completely Soviet-controlled system of the early 1950s.
In practical terms, the new form of interstate relations has
been manifested in both internal and external policy.

Internally,

alliance relations have become increasingly charaterized by unity
through accommodation of pluralistic tendencies, moderated of course
by Soviet predominance*.

Specifically, the alliance has been character

ized by increased efforts toward functional economic cooperation, by
an expansion of the political role of the Warsaw Treaty Organization,

7^For an assessment of Eastern Europe as the "core" of the
socialist system, see Jamgotch, Soviet--East European Dialogue:
International Relations of a New Type? , pp. 29-33.
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and by a campaign to restore ideological unity.

Externally, socialist

internationalism has been reflected in new forms of relations with
the West, conducted through intensified coordination of bloc foreign
policies.
There have been instructive parallels between domestic
Soviet policy and the emerging form of alliance relations.

In 1971

the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party announced
a ,fpeace program" abroad and an "ideological war" domestically,
reflecting a desire to derive specific benefits through cooperation
with the West while maintaining firm domestic control.
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Similarly,

the new form of alliance relations has been characterized by growing
cooperation with the West and by increased concern for tight alliance
management.
The linkage between external developments and internal
alliance relations has been the fundamental feature of socialist
internationalism.

While the reduction of East-West tension and the

expansion of trade relations between East and West during the 1960s
presented the states of Eastern Europe with the opportunity for
importing much-needed technological assistance, the new form of
relations with the West threatened to introduce disruptive tendencies
into the alliance.
With the failure of the 1962 Basic Principles plan for COMECON

79

Report to the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress, Pravda, March 31,
1971, as translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press
23, April 12, 1971, pp. 3-13; May 4, 1971, pp. 1-12.
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integration, Eastern Europe began to turn increasingly to Western
markets.

While trade among COMECON members doubled from 1962 to 1972,

trade with Western Europe during the same period quadrupled, and
on

trade with the United States and Japan increased eight-fold.OKJ While
the total volume of trade with the West amounted to less than onethird of COMECON trade even by 1972, the bilateral nature of the
exchanges and the rapid expansion of trade relations threatened to
upset the nature of COMECON trade and, ultimately, of East European
integration.

Thus by the late 1960s the need became apparent for a

coordinated approach to the West on the one hand and a new basis for
East European integration on the other.
By 1966 the East European alliance had already formulated,
in general terms, a plan for a European conference on security and
cooperation.

Following a meeting in Bucharest in 1966, the WTO

Political Consultative Committee issued a proposal for the recognition
of existing European boundaries, the creation of a new security
system in Europe, the exclusion

of West Germany from access to

nuclear weapons, and the promotion of economic, scientific and technical cooperation between East and West.

The problem which remained,

however, was to build a tight, integrated socialist community in an
era of East-West detente and expanded contacts between East and West.

^Statistical Yearbook. 1973 (New York:
1974), Table B.

United Nations,

SlPravda, March 18, 1966, as translated in The Current Digest
of the Soviet Press 18 , July 27, 1966 , pp..3-7.
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Alliance Management in the 1970s
The process of change in alliance relationships was accelerated
by two developments:

the exchange of diplomatic recognition between

Rumania and West Germany in 1967 and the crisis and subsequent
intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The Rumanian action under

scored both the altered nature of interbloc relations in Europe and
the potential problems of independent East European policies toward
the West.

The crisis in Czechoslovakia and its difficult resolution

revealed both the inadequacy of bloc consultative arrangements and
the need for creating long-term economic ties among the states of
Eastern Europe.

Additionally, the manifestation of pervasive anti-

Soviet sentiment may have convinced the Soviet leadership to attempt
to weld .a .more genuine form of ideological unity in the alliance.
During 1968 and 1969 a number of official pronouncements set
the stage for coming alliance developments, developments which seemed
to bear out the promise of "international relations of a new type.11
Not only did these pronouncements reflect new alliance functions and
purposes, but they reflected a new pattern of interstate relations in
the alliance system.
In June of 1969, for example, a communique from the
International Conference of Communist and Workers1 Parties asserted,
All parties have equal rights. At this time when there is
no leading center of the international communist movement,
voluntary coordination of the actions of parties in order
effectively to carry out the tasks before them acquires increased

79

importance
Even when allowance is made for the rhetorical aspects of the Conference
statement, the departure from past communiques is apparent.

Moreover,

developments since 1969 have affirmed the "increased importance"
which has been attached to "voluntary coordination" among communist
parties on ideological topics.
The second official pronouncement was the well-known Brezhnev
Doctrine.

The ideological justification for the invasion of

Czechoslovakia, delivered in September of 1968, asserted that "the
weakening of any link in the world socialist system has a direct
effect on all the socialist countries."

Arguing that the socialist

states had an "internationalist duty" to defend socialism, the
pronouncement went on to justify the "actions taken in Czechoslovakia
by the five allied socialist countries" as "actions aimed at defending
the fundamental interests of the socialist commonwealth."^

At

first glance, the Brezhnev Doctrine did little more than officially
affirm the long-standing Soviet determination to preserve its sphere
of influence in Eastern Europe.

The fact that this determination

was justified at such length, however, signalled a basic shift in
the function of the Warsaw Pact, which includes no provision for

82>'Basic Document Adopted by the International Conference
of Communists and Workers1 Parties in Moscow, June 17, 1969," Pravda.
June 18, 1969, as translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet
Press 21, August 6, 1969,;p..24.
^"Sovereignty and International Obligations of Socialist
Countries," Pravda, September 26, 1968, as translated in The Current
Digest of the Soviet Press 20, October 16, 1968, pp. 10-12.
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concerted action against a Pact member.

Thus, following 1968, the

Warsaw Pact functions had been officially broadened to include, in
addition to defense against external attack, the defense of socialism
from both internal and external enemies.
The third official pronouncement was significant not for what
it did say, but for what it did not say.

In the months preceding the

April, 1969, special COMECON session, it was widely feared in Eastern
Europe that the Soviet Union would attempt to create a supranational
agency of the kind envisioned in 1962.^4

The communiquef which

followed the summit, however, called for

improved cooperation,

coordination, and specialization by any "interested countries
according to necessity."
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No reference was made to a supranational

agency, and the word "integration" was not mentioned.

In fact, a

month earlier the Soviet representative to COMECON, Mikhail Lesechko,
had argued that the implementation of any cooperative measures
"wholly depends on the wishes of interested Comecon countries and must
be founded on their voluntary participation."^

The theme of voluntary
'*

o

participation was to be the foundation of the COMECON integration
program announced two years later.

OA

OHFor. an excellent summary of statements in the East European
press, see Henry W. Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics of Integration
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), pp. 3-48.
85" C o m m u n i q u e on the Twenty-third Special Comecon Session,"
Pravda, April 27, 1969, as translated in The Current Digest of the
Soviet Press 21, May 14, 1969, p. 9.
^Cited by Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics of Integration,
p. 43.
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The Comprehensive Program of Integration
A West German economist, using the analogy of a ship, has
assessed the problems of East European economic integration in this
way:
Neither the helmsman nor several of the crew of the East
European boat are willing to unleash this economic integration from
within. Or in terms of the metaphor, they are unwilling to coordi
nate the various activities and duties of the crew because none
of its members has sufficient authority and power to do so, and
the abilities of the captain are doubted and distrusted.
Consequently, the ship moves back and forth and ahead by the
sheer force of the wind (e.g. the demand for manufactured goods
by the USSR from Eastern Europe) and by the resultant of the
various forces exerted by the members of the crew. Frustrating
attempts to create the conditions for integration from without . .
are being introduced. . .
Clearly, economic integration through the use of a supranational
agency would be more in keeping with the modus operandi of the Soviet
Union.

As the experience of 1962 had shown, however, attempts to

create and promote integration "from within" arouse strong opposition
in Eastern Europe.

From 1969 to 1971, COMECON sessions and interparty

meetings were devoted to the problem of approaching integration "from
without" through the gradual processes of specialization and coopera
tion.
Attempts toward COMECON integration remained intimately tied
to the emerging bloc policy toward pan-European security and coopera
tion.

Meeting in Budapest in 1969, the Warsaw Pact members repeated

87jc>zef M. P. van Brabant, Essays on Planning, Trade and
Integration in Eastern Europe (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press,
1974), p. 22.
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the call for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.®**
Thus between 1969 and 1971 there began to emerge a complex strategy
of coordinating bloc policies toward the West, while at the same
time promoting basic integration of key industries in Eastern Europe.
It is evident that the debate over the future of COMECON inte
gration was marked by sharp differences of opinion and that the program
ultimately announced reflected a compromise solution.

An article in

the Hungarian press concerning the November, 1970, meeting of COMECON*s
Permanent Economic Committee reported fundamental differences, "espe
cially concerning the estimation of the relationship between, and
importance of, plan and market,1* and noted that "debate was particularly
trenchant on the question of [ currency ] convertibility."®^
Despite the conflict over particular aspects of COMECON
integration, the general consensus among East European leaders was
that coordination of bloc policies toward the West was vital to all
their interests and that improved COMECON relations--so long as they
did not involve the creation of a supranational agency--were necessary
for economic

d e v e l o p m e n t . ^

Maintaining its maverick role, Rumania

consistently opposed. COMECON integration, rejecting what an article
in the Rumanian press called "proposals of an integrationist nature

Pravda, March 18, 1969, as translated in The Current Digest
of the Soviet Press 21, April 2, 1969,:pp. 11-12.
®^Report on the conference by K. Apatini in Penzugyi Szemle,
January, 1971, as cited by Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics of
Integration, p. 143.
90For an assessment of attitudes as expressed in the East
European press, see ibid., pp. 61-158.
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bordering on transgression of the independence of the socialist states,
their sovereignty, their right to decide independently about their
entire economic activity."91
During 1971, however, Rumania was increasingly forced into a
position of isolation which it could not maintain.

At the Twenty-fourth

COMECON Executive Council, an International Investment Bank (IIB)
(see Table 4) had been created to supplement the activities of the
International Bank of Economic Cooperation.

Rumania initially

abstained from joining IIB, apparently because the bank*s procedures
provided for a three-fourths majority vote on some issues, rather
than the rule of unanimity which had been followed in all previous
COMECON ventures.

The case of the IIB quickly exposed the limits of

Rumanian independence.

Unwilling to deny itself the use of much-

needed investment funds and afraid of finding itself unable to
exercise any influence on decisions of potential importance for all
of Eastern Europe, Rumania reluctantly joined the Investment Bank.
Rumania, which had almost single-handedly subverted the 1962
COMECON integration plan, found itself utterly unable to resist the
forces of integration in 1970.

Threatened with the withdrawal of

Soviet oil supplies, Rumanian President Ceausescu signed a five year
Soviet-Rumanian protocol on coordination of national economic plans
in return for a Soviet pledge.to increase oil deliveries.

Rumania*s

reluctant endorsement of COMECON programs, demonstrated again in

9^1. Radulescu,. Probleme Economice. April 1971, as cited by
Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics of Integration, p'. 112.
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TABLE 4
COMECON COMMITTEES, CONFERENCES AND
AGENCIES CREATED SINCE 1968

Year of
creation

Organization

Committees

Interstate Commission on Calculating Techniques

1969

Committee on Economic Problems

1970

Committee for Cooperation and Planning

1971

Committee for Scientific and Technical Cooperation

1971

Committee for Scientific and Technical Information

1971

*

Conferences

Conference on Legal Affairs

1970

Conference on Technological Inventions and Patents

1971

Ministers of Home Trade

1971

Agencies (associated committees)

Interchim (Petro-chemical industry)

1969

International Investment Bank (currency and finance)

1971

Interatominst (atomic energy)

1972
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SOURCES:
The Europa Year Book, 1974. London: Europa
Publications, Ltd., 1974. Pp. 186-87.
Brabant, Josef M. P. van. Essays on Planning in
Eastern Europe. Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1974. Pp. 8-16.
Rumania*s decision to join Interchim and Intermetall, removed the
final obstacle to the new integration program. 92
Although Rumania succumbed to strong Soviet pressure in 1970
and 1971, it should be noted that Rumania was able to extract signifi
cant concessions from its larger neighbor.

The very fact that the

Soviet Union felt constrained to increase oil deliveries in return
for Rumanian cooperation reflected the existence of "international
relations of a new type."
Concessions and compromise also marked the Comprehensive
Program of Socialist Integration signed in August of 1971 (see
t

Table 5).

The reference in Section 2 to the problems of the less

developed East European members stands in marked contrast to the
Basic Principles plan of 1962, which would have relegated them to the
status of suppliers of raw materials.

The same theme was developed

in a recent article in the Soviet press.

Arguing that "the existing

differences in development levels retards the deepening of the
international socialist division of labour and the process of
integration," the article noted that "the maximum gap in the per

9^For a discussion of Soviet-Rumanian relations during 1970
and 1971, see Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics of Integration,
pp. 98-113.

86

TABLE 5
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM
OF INTEGRATION

Section

1.

Introduction

The purpose of the Program is "the grad
ual . . . equalization of the members1
economic development levels, and the
formation of

profound and stable ties

in the fundamental sectors of the econ
omy

’Integration," it is emphasized,

"is taking place on the basis of
complete voluntaryism; it is not
accompanied by the creation of supra
national organs."
2.

Leveling

Less developed members are promised
"preferential conditions for coopera
tion."

3.

The nature of cooperation is to be

through 9.
Consultation,

decided upon by all interested coun
tries , and integration is to be a pro

Planning,

cess "regulated in a deliberate and

Cooperation

planned manner."

Financial reform is

to be negotiated according to a planned

TABLE 5— Continued

Section

schedule.

Direct bilateral ties and

joint production ventures are per
mitted, but joint organizations "will
not be supranational in nature, or
touch on internal planning questions."

10 .

Specific timetables are drawn up for

through 14.
Cooperation in
Specific Spheres

cooperation and specialization in
industry, agriculture, transportation,
construction, and water resources
utilization.
The legal basis of cooperation is to be

15.
through 17.
Legal and

improved "by bringing closer together
the corresponding national legal norms

Organizational

and also through their unification by

Questions

the interested countries."

Provisions

are made for multilateral decisions on
the legal regulation of joint organiza
tions and for the creation of new
organizations by interested states.
"Every COMECON country has the right to
state at any moment its interest in
participating in a measure of the
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TABLE 5— Continued

Section
*
comprehensive program in which it has
previously refused to participate for
one reason or another."

Participation,

it is repeated, is to be on a
"completely voluntary" basis.

SOURCE: "Complex Integration Program," Pravda, August 7,
1971, as cited by Henry W. Schaefer, COMECON and the Politics of
Integration. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 159-72.
[ Emphasis added. ]

capita production of national income between the CMEA countries from
1950 to 1970 declined from 3.1:1 to 1.9:1."^

The new emphasis on

"leveling" appears to be a concession and an inducement to the less
developed COMECON members, particularly to Rumania.
The emphasis in the Comprehensive Program is entirely on volun
tary cooperation among interested countries:
is explicitly ruled out.

supranational planning

Aside from the emphasis on voluntary par

ticipation, the most striking feature of the Comprehensive Program
is the limited nature of its objectives.

It has been frequently

repeated in the Soviet press that integration must be a gradual and
deliberate process.

9^A. Shabalin, "The Comprehensive Programme of Integration,"
International Affairs [ Moscow ], April 1975, pp. 18-19.
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The vagueness of Sections Three through Fourteen has led one
analyst to conclude that *'the concept of socialist integration, as it
appears in the [ Comprehensive Program ], leaves much to be desired:
it clearly amounts to a very long-term aim, if even that.

94

Such

a conclusion is justified only if one defines integration in terms
of unification through a supranational agency.
was clearly more limited.

The objective in 1971

Aside from the purely economic objectives

of improved cooperation, the principal aim of the Soviet Union, and
to varying degrees of its East European allies, was to construct ties
so complex that no member could extricate itself from the alliance
without suffering economic catastrophe.
It should also be noted that the Comprehensive Program was
superimposed on an already complex network of organizations and trade
agreements.

More importantly, the Comprehensive Program represented

the first serious effort to deal with a number of problems of East
European economic integration:

investment funding, pricing, currency

convertibility, and central planning through coordination of national
plans.
Central planning had, of course, been tried on previous
occasions.

As indicated in Table 4, however, the 1971 plan created

three new commissions to deal with planning and. coordination, and by
1974 several COMECON members had for the first time included in their

9 ^ a n Brabant, Essays on Planning, Trade and Integration
in Eastern Europe, p. 109.
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national economic plans sections dealing with

integration.^

On

balance, it appears that the improved coordination of national plans
is the best compromise between two extreme alternatives:

planning

through a supranational agency and reliance on market forces.
A number of problems, it should be noted, were simply tabled
for further discussion.

Agreement of the use of the transferable ruble

as international currency, for example, was to follow prolonged dis
cussion during the 1970s, with a final decision to be made no earlier
than 1980.

Specialization and coordination of scientific research,

to be conducted through some 1,600 research institutes,96 is also
likely to be a long process.
The chief virtue of the Comprehensive Program was that it
improved the general framework for cooperation.

The provision for

voluntary participation, for example, means that a veto by one
member can no longer prevent activity.

Additionally, Sections Ten

through Fourteen established detailed programs for joint planning and
cooperation in key industries and in agriculture.

By 1975 it was

already apparent that coordination of national plans and cooperation
through COMECON agencies had increased significantly the importdependence of COMECON members.97
The implementation of the Comprehensive Program, however, has
not been an entirely smooth process.

Since 1971, the Soviet Union

has used its near monopoly on bloc raw materials as a means of assuring

95shabalin, ’’The Comprehensive Programme of Integration," p. 15.
96ibid., p. 16.
9?Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics of Integration,
pp. 170-94; and van Brabant, Essays on Planning. Trade and Integration
in Eastern Europe, pp. 270-93.
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cooperation from reluctant allies.

Earlier this year it was announced

that Soviet oil prices would no longer be based on previously agreed
rates, but would fluctuate with the world market.

The impact of the

Soviet decision on Eastern Europe has been profound.

Referring to

balance of payments problems resulting from increased oil prices,
Hungary1s Janos Radar recently spoke of the need for ’’much better
utilization than previously of the great opportunities inherent in
the economic cooperation of the socialist countries.
The most interesting case has been that of Rumania, where
Soviet influence has been more direct.

Soviet-Rumanian trade, which

has increased by 40 percent in the last five years, was expanded
another 10 percent by the Soviet-Rumanian trade protocol of 1975.
The 1975 protocol, which followed negotiations over the continuance
of Soviet oil deliveries, was accompanied by five-year'agreements
on Soviet-Rumanian technical cooperation.^9

Thus while Rumanian

President Ceausescu has continued to assert that "attempts are
sometimes made to deny and underestimate the historic role of the
nation in the present stage of building socialism,”100 he has been
forced to increase systematically Rumania’s economic dependence on

98cited by Dusko Doder, "Hungary Reports Economic Setbacks,"
Washington Post. March 18, 1975.
Situation Report/l, Radio Free Europe Research.
January 10, 1975, p. 4; and Rumanian Situation Report/5, Radio Free
Europe Research, February 5, 1975, pp. 3-4.
^ R u m a n i a n

l^^Ceausescu1s speech of March 28, 1975, as quoted in
Rumanian Situation Report/14, Radio Free Europe Research. April 17,
1975, p. 3.
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the Soviet Union.
The existence of Soviet pressure should not, however, obscure
the fundamental consensus of views in Eastern Europe.

It is widely

believed among East European leaders that economic stability,
particularly in the period of expanded East-West trade relations,
demands close cooperation among the states of Eastern Europe and tight
coordination of bloc foreign policies.

At a more basic level, it is

believed that political security in Eastern Europe demands a strong
and unified alliance.
The Changing Role of the Warsaw Pact
Writing in 1969, one analyst, referring to the decline in
East-West hostilities, concluded that "once both sides had realized
that the threats were largely imaginary, [NATO and the Warsaw Pact ]
lost their raison d 1litre."101

Since that writing, the military threat

faced by the Warsaw Pact countries has continued to diminish.

In

the Moscow-Bonn agreement of 1970, the Soviet Union and West Germany
agreed to "respect unreservedly the territorial integrity of all
states in Europe in their present frontiers."102

Moscow-Bonn

Treaty, the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, and the treaties signed
between West Germany and East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia have
served to formalize the status quo in central Europe.

As one Soviet

lOlAndrzej Kobonski, "The Warsaw Pact," International
Conciliation, no. 573 (May 1969), p. 73.
102soviet--West German Treaty, as translated from the West
German Press in Current History, October 1970, p. 238.
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spokesman recently observed,
The situation in Europe has changed considerably in the past
few years. . . . Whereas back in the 1960's we Communists*
correctly brought to the forefront the task of consolidating the
territorial and political results of World War II, now we have
every reason to say that the major successes in accomplishing
this task are indisputable.103
Thus by 1972 the threats which the Warsaw Pact had been formed
to counter had gradually dissolved.

The conclusion that the Pact

has lost its raison d'etre, however, is wrong on two counts.

In a

purely military sense, the WTO continues to serve to maintain the
European power balance, and a strong WTO remains vital to the
negotiating position of the Eastern bloc in relations with the West.
More importantly, the WTO's role in bloc affairs has been altered to
meet a new type of threat.

As one analyst has argued,

The absence of danger can itself become a danger--a paradox
that sometimes has very concrete consequences. Detente and
cooperation do indeed reduce the possibility of a military con
flict, but they increase the possibilities of ideological
"infection."104
The possibility of ideological infection, in turn, increases the threat
to the preservation of political power and authority in Eastern Europe.
Of course, the Warsaw Pact has always represented a good deal
more than simply an integrated military defense command.

It is not

going too far to say that never before have a group of rulers depended

lO^Speech by
Ponomarev at the meeting of European
Communist and Workers' Parties, Pravda, October 18, 1974, as translated
in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 26, November 13, 1974,

p. 3.
104peter Bender, East Europe in Search of Security (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 7.
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so much on an international alliance system for their continued legiti
macy.

The difficulties of applying revolutionary doctrine on a broad

scale, as well as the international requirements of Marxism, have
served to imbue the Warsaw Pact with an "internationalist duty”
which far exceeds pure military objectives.

As the Brezhnev Doctrine

has made clear, the "internationalist duty" of the socialist states
includes the defense of socialism from internal, as well as external,
enemies.
All the evidence suggests an expansion, rather than a
contraction, of Warsaw Pact activities since 1968.

In 1969 alone, the

Warsaw Pact held six conferences and conducted six joint military
exercises.

Additionally, the reorganization of the joint armed

forces, announced by the March, 1969, Political Consultative
Committee, provided for the creation of three new WTO organs:

the

Military Council, the Technical Committee of the Joint Armed Forces,
and the Committee of Defense Ministers.

Although the nature of the

reorganization plan has never been made public, assessments by East
European leaders, including Rumania's Ceausescu, suggest that the
new structure permits greater participation in WTO by the East
i t
106
European allies.

As has been the case in COMECON, Rumania's policies toward the

^~*The Europa Yearbook, 1974 (London, England:
Publications, Ltd., 1974), p. 409.
106

Europa

For an assessment and a summary of East European press
reports, see Robin Alison Remington, The Warsaw Pact (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 114-33.
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Warsaw Pact provide a yardstick for the assessment of the emergence
of new bloc relations.

Although he endorsed the reorganization plan,

Rumanian President Ceausescu made it clear that he felt defense
against external aggression to be "the only plausible reason for the
existence of [ the Warsaw Pact ]."^^

Since 1969, however, the

Soviet Union apparently has endeavored to elicit Rumanians cooperation
in Warsaw Pact activities by granting Rumania a greater decision
making role.

Following the 1969 Moscow summit, for example, the

Rumanian press commented that now each country could "make a contri
bution of major importance" in bloc affairs.
As a result of continuing Soviet pressure, Rumania has
expanded greatly its participation in Warsaw Pact activities since
1969.

Following extensive consultation throughout 1970, Rumania and

the Soviet Union signed the long-awaited Soviet-Rumanian Friendship
Treaty, agreeing "unswervingly to observe the commitments envisaged
in the Warsaw Treaty.*’109

The expansion of Rumania1s role in the

Warsaw Pact was capped in 1973, when for the first time since 1962
joint WTO exercises were held in Rumanian territory.
By 1970, the new role of the Warsaw Pact had become more

IQ^Scinteia, April 11, 1969, as cited by Remington, The
Warsaw Pact, p. 130.
108s cinteia. December 7, 1969, as cited by Remington, The
Warsaw Pact, p, 125.
109"Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid Between
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Socialist Republic of
Rumania," Pravda. July 8, 1970, as translated in The Current Digest
of the Soviet Press 22, August 11, 1970, p. 8.

96

apparent.

With NATO*s tentative acceptance of the Warsaw Pact propo

sal for a European security conference and the signing of the
Moscow-Bonn agreement, attention in Eastern Europe was turned to the
problems inherent in the rapid expansion of contacts with the West.
Specifically, the reorientation of WTO activities has been reflected
in the increased concern over the ideological danger from the West
and in the expanded use of the PCC as a means of coordinating bloc
foreign policies.
The August, 1970, PCC meeting was attended by delegations
which included all Party First Secretaries, as well as various
Politburo members, representatives of the chiefs-of-staffs, East
European ambassadors to the Soviet Union, and central committee
secretaries in charge of interparty relations.

u

The increased

emphasis on the PCC has been paralleled by regular meetings of the
newly-formed Military Council and Committee of Defense Ministers.

The

importance of the WTO was emphasized by Leonid Brezhnev in his address
to the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress:

"The Warsaw Pact has been, and

remains, the main center for coordinating the fraternal countries*
foreign policy.
The December, 1970, meeting of the PCC--the second in five
months--reflected the difficulties of establishing a unified bloc
policy toward the West.
compromise.

The conference communique" was a study in

The emphasis on "sovereignty, . . , equality and

"^Remington, The Warsaw Pact, pp. 188-89.
m C i t e d by Remington, The Warsaw Pact, p. 165.

noninterference” was obviously a concession to Rumanian concerns.
Additionally, explicit references were made to the*concerns of
Czechoslovakia, and "the conference unanimously expressed solidarity
with the peace-loving policy of the German Democratic Republic.
Beyond these surface difficulties, however, were the more profound
problems associated with detente.
With the rapid improvement of Soviet-American relations and
the West German Ostpolitik of 1970-1972, the threat from the
hashington-Bonn axis" became increasingly difficult to invoke as a
rallying cry in Eastern Europe.

Not only did the decline of East-West

tension diminish the objective need for bloc unity, but the rapid
expansion of contacts with the West increased the less tangible threat
of ideological "softening up.1* Thus the process of detente poses a
twofold threat in Eastern Europe:

on the one hand, it threatens to

undermine the socialist unity on which the stability of the East
European regimes rests; and on the other, it threatens to introduce
liberalizing elements into East European societies.
The threat of ideological "infection11 has been felt most
keenly in East Germany.

Since ideology has always been the principal

justification for the existence of a separate German state, East
Germany has attached great importance to the policy of abgrenzung. the
sharpening of the ideological struggle.

As a recent East German

■^-•^"Statement on Questions of the Strengthening of Security
and the Development of Peaceful Cooperation in Europe," Pravda,
December 4, 1970, as translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet
Press 22, January 5, 1971, p. 2.
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Communist party resolution warned, "In view of the mass contacts of
human beings of opposite ideologies and ways of living, the greatest
i 1 O

degree of class awareness and activity are mandatory.

It is

transparently obvious, however, that the real threat perceived in East
Germany is not to Communist ideology but to the political security of
the existing regime.

Despite the economic expansion enjoyed in the

German Democratic Republic (GDR), the attraction of Western standards
of living, it is feared, will raise new expectations and new demands
within East German society.
Similar fears have been voiced in Czechoslovakia.

The

Czechoslovak leadership, faced with the task of political consolida
tion in the wake of the Prague Spring, has endorsed the East German
call for the sharpening of the ideological struggle.

A recent article

Rude Pravo, for example, warned,
Bourgeois politicians and ideologists who decide to attain old
anticommunist goals by new "peaceful" means rely on the develop
ment of commercial and other contacts between capitalist and
socialist countries to revive inside socialism the influence of
ideas completely alien to socialism.
For the East European leaderships, the solution to the
problems inherent in expanded East-West relations has been a revival
of domestic conservatism and political repression.

With the exception

^■^Cited by John Dornberg, l!East Germany: The Special Case,"
in East European Perspectives on European Security and Cooperation,
ed. Robert R. King and Robert W. Dean (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1974), p. 116.
114cited by Robert W. Dean, "Foreign Policy Perspectives and
European Security: Poland and Czechoslovakia," in East European
Perspectives on European Security and Cooperation, ed. Robert R. King
and Robert W. Dean (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 161.
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of Hungary, which continues to have the most liberal domestic policies
in the bloc, every country in Eastern Europe has reverted to domestic
orthodoxy through economic recentralization, political purges, and
ideological campaigns.

The problem, of course, is to justify and

to maintain the campaign of repression in an era characterized by the
relaxation of tension in Europe.
The increased concern for political security in Eastern Europe
explains the recent expansion of Warsaw Pact activities.

By reaffirm

ing the requirements of socialist internationalism, including those
implicit in the Warsaw Pact, the East European leaders are able to
provide at least some justification for the maintenance of domestic
conservatism.

The threat implicit in the Brezhnev Doctrine provides

an additional source of justification.

By alluding to the example

of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and by pointing to the presence of Soviet
troops in Eastern Europe, the East European leaders may justify
domestic repression as being necessary for the maintenance of "correct"
relations with Moscow.

As was argued, with perhaps a touch of

sarcasm, in the Hungarian press, "In its own national interest, a
socialist country cannot do better than aim at close unity with the
Soviet Union.
The paradox could hardly be more complete.

The process of

detente, far from promoting liberalism in Eastern Europe, has

•^^Nepszabadsag% Budapest, July 24, 1973, as cited by Charles
Andras, "European Cooperation and Ideological Conflict," in East
European Perspectives on European Security and Cooperation, ed..
Robert R. King and Robert W. Dean (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1974), p. 31.

100

contributed to a revival of domestic repression and renewed concern
for bloc unity.

In the long run, of course, detente and the expansion

of East-West contacts may bring about profound changes in Eastern
Europe.

It is through an awareness of the possible long-range

consequences of detente that the Soviet Union and its allies have
stepped up the campaign for ideological unity in the bloc.

Ideological Unity and Disunity
Another paradox of the era of detente is that the expansion
of pragmatic contacts between the communist countries and the advanced
capitalist countries has been accompanied by an intensification of
the communist ideological campaign.

The Soviet press in particular

has gone to some lengths to affirm the continuation of the "histori
cally inevitable" class struggle.

One article, significantly

entitled "The Dialectics of Detente," argued,
Soviet-American relations are clear evidence that the
peaceful coexistence policy is a dialectical blend of cooperation
and struggle. . . . The normalization of Soviet-American relations
shows what impressive results can be achieved for peace and
international security without renouncing principle and the class
approach.116
Thus at the same time the Soviet Union has expanded its con
tacts with the historic "class enemies" in the West, the Soviet press
has reaffirmed the Soviet commitment to Marxism-Leninism.

This

seeming contradiction was addressed by Robert Tucker, who argued,
Not only would a Soviet Communist movement in the process
of deradicalization go on proclaiming its adherence to the final

H^Jan Prazsky, "The Dialectics of Detente," World Marxist
Review 17 (September 1974):128.
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goals of the movement; it would, by virtue of the dialectic of the
process, reaffirm the goals in very strong terms, as it has done.
For intensified verbal allegiance to ultimate ideological goals
belongs to the pattern of deradicalization.-^7
The same pattern has been demonstrated in the alliance during
the period of detente.

The "deradicalization" implicit in expanded

East-West relations has been accompanied by ostentatious pronounce
ments of ideological unity in Eastern Europe.

As is the case in

Soviet domestic policy, ideological unity in the alliance serves to
justify domestic conservatism and to safeguard political security.
A number of developments not necessarily related to detente
have prompted the new ideological campaign as well.

Widespread

political apathy, particularly among socialist youth, has tended to
erode the source of political support in Eastern Europe.

The new

emphasis on consumer goods production, too, reflects the concerns
of a populace increasingly interested in achieving a standard of
living comparable to that in the West.

Symptomatic of the growing

domestic problems in Eastern Europe is the growth of small but vocal
groups of political dissidents.

"Thus," one Soviet journalist has

concluded, "internal developments as well as the external political
situation objectively [ demand ] closer cohesion and unity of the
socialist countries.

H^Robert C. Tucker, "The Deradicalization of Marxist
Movements," American Political Science Review 61 (June 1967):
358.
Dolgin, "Unity of the Fraternal Countries— A Condition
for Strengthening the Position of Socialism," International Affairs
[ Moscow ], December 1973, p. 9.
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Obviously, socialist unity cannot be of the monolithic
character known under Stalin.

Soviet acceptance of different interpre

tations of the correct path to socialism has been well demonstrated:
examples include toleration of Rumania’s national self-assertiveness,
acceptance of Hungary's economic experimentation, the cautious
/

approaches to Poland's domestic crises of 1968 and 1970, and, most
recently, the partial rapprochement with Yugoslavia.

The new approach

to socialist unity, conducted under the banner of "socialist
internationalism,11 reflects a new willingness to acknowledge and
accept polycentrism in the socialist camp.
Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia in 1971, followed by the 1973
visit by Kosygin, marked the beginning of the new drive for unity
among the socialist states.

The high point of Soviet-Yugoslav

relations came in 1974, during talks in preparation for the panEuropean conference of communist parties.

Significantly, the talks

were attended by representatives of the Yugoslav and Rumanian regimes,
both of which had refused to send representatives to the 1967
Karlovy Vary conference.

During the first round of talks, a Yugoslav

report suggested a new Soviet willingness to expand the conference
decision-making procedures.

"The rules of procedure," it was reported,

"contain, among other things, those political-procedural problems,
including the provision for decision-making by consensus, on which
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the League of Communists of Yugoslavia had i n s i s t e d . D e s p i t e
the fact that new disputes have emerged since the time of the
Yugoslav report, it is apparent that the Soviet Union continues to work
to achieve at least the appearance of unity at the international
conference.120
The major effort of the Soviet ideological campaign, of
course, has been to establish unity among the Warsaw Pact allies.

In

addition to the expansion of the activities of the Political
Consultative Committee, efforts toward bloc unity have been manifested
in an increase in the number of bilateral and multilateral meetings
among top party officials.

Moreover, a new forum for the expression

of bloc unity has been added:

a yearly conference of Soviet and East

European leaders in the Crimea.
In 1973, following the first conference in the Crimea, Soviet
party leader Leonid Brezhnev noted, "participants in the Crimea
meeting were unanimous in the opinion that at the present stage it is
essential to improve considerably the standard of ideological coopera
tion among the fraternal countries and parties."121

nature of the

H^Radio Belgrade, October 16, 1974, as cited by Kevin Devlin,
"The International Communist Movement: European Communist Conference,"
Radio Background Report/5 (Eastern Europe), Radio Free Europe Research,
January 17, 1975, p. 10.
120-por an analysis of the continuing debate over the confer
ence, see Kevin Devlin, "Pre-conference Debate Behind Closed Doors,"
Radio Background Report/31 (Pan-European Communist Conference), Radio
Free Europe Research. February 26, 1975.
l^lRadio Moscow, August 15, 1973, as cited by Andras,
European Cooperation and Ideological Conflict," p. 28.
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meeting was made more clear in an article in the Czechoslovak news
paper Rude Pravo. which argued that the meetings were made necessary
by the fact that ’’the revival of international relations [ had ]
activated anticommunist propaganda.11 The final goal of ideological
consolidation, the article went on to say, must be "to protect the
building of socialism at home against the aggressive endeavors of
imperialism.
Thus by 1973 the implications of "socialist internationalism"
had become clear.

The intensive ideological campaign was designed

to confront a threat seen in terms of political security rather than
in terms of pure ideology.

Similarly, Warsaw Pact activities were

expanded to confront new problems of policy coordination and new
threats to political security in Eastern Europe.

In the face of

expanded East-West trade relations, economic integration through
COMECON was designed to establish new and long-term links among
the states of Eastern Europe.
Internal alliance developments were, of course, closely
related to the emerging pattern of Soviet bloc detente diplomacy.

As

Leonid Brezhnev emphasized at the 1973 Crimea meeting, "The cohesion
of the socialist countries and our close interaction are at the basis
of everything we have secured in relaxing tension."123

122Rude Pravo, August 25, 1973, as cited by Andras, "European
Cooperation and Ideological Conflict," p. 28.
Incited by Dolgin, "Unity of the Fraternal Countries," p. 11.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION:

DETENTE AND

ALLIANCE COHESION

An assumption widely shared among Western observers--scholars
and statesmen alike--is that the normalization of East-West relations
will lead ultimately to a loosening of the bonds between the Soviet
Union and its East European allies.

While it is still too early to

render a final judgment, recent developments in the East European
alliance suggest the opposite conclusion.

The process of detente,

far from contributing to the disintegration of the alliance, has
served to stimulate a renewed drive for alliance cohesion.
The relationship between internal and external developments
does, however, provide some insight into the nature of East European
integration, for one way of judging the viability of any system is
to assess the ability of the system to react and adapt to changes
in its external environment.

As Morton Kaplan has proposed, "The

stability or flexibility of a system depends upon its capacity to
overcome environmental disturbances .
The changes in alliance relationships between the early
1950s and the mid-1960s were primarily attributable to the profound

Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International
Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), p. 99
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changes taking place domestically in Eastern Europe.

In the early

years of the alliance, cohesion was imposed by the Soviet Union on
East European regimes which were scarcely in a position to resist.
Once the East European regimes had gained and consolidated power,
however, they were soon faced with domestic crises which demanded
new forms of alliance relations.

The response to these new demands

was Khrushchev's attempt to create a more complex and resilient
alliance framework through a revived COMECON and through the Warsaw
Treaty Organization.

For the remainder of the Khrushchev era, it

was primarily the interplay between domestic developments and
alliance relations which determined the course of integration in the
alliance.

Aside from the disruptions of polycentric Communism, the

international environment remained generally stable until the early
1960s.
Since that time, however, the situation has been reversed.
Domestic disruptions in Eastern Europe have, if not disappeared,
at least subsided, but profound changes in the international environ
ment have created new demands for the alliance system.

An interesting

commentary was recently provided by a Soviet journalist, who, refer
ring to crises in NATO relations, argued that "these developments
have once again exposed the futile and outdated character of the old
structure . . . , a structure that was adapted to the period of tough
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confrontation with the socialist world,"

125

The same line of argu

ment, of course, could be applied equally well to the crisis faced
in the East European alliance system, which was adapted to confront
the perceived threat from the West.
Since the early 1960s, the tight bipolar system, characterized
by "tough confrontation" between the two power blocs, has given way to
a much more fluid and unstable situation.

The gradual process of

East-West detente, which dates at least from the 1963 Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty, has accelerated rapidly since 1970.

The improvement in

Soviet-American relations and, more importantly, the settlement of
the territorial disputes in central Europe have dramatically altered
the nature of the international system.

Thus by 1974, a Soviet

analyst could argue, "By the early 1970fs, the prerequisites for a
radical restructuring of the system of contemporary international
relations developed on the world scene."

126

In addition to demanding new forms ofinterbloc

relations,

the altered international situation required new forms of relations
within the Soviet bl8c.

Associated with the new interbloc situation

were a number of specific concerns, including the rapid expansion of
East-West trade, the development of increased human contacts with
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Y. Davydov, "USA--Western Europe: A 'New Relationship,’"
International Affairs [ Moscow ], January 1974, pp. 36-37.
Davydov, who had been a frequent contributor to
International Affairs, defected to the West while on assignment to
Japan early in 1975.
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the West, and the decline of military tension in Europe.

The nature

of alliance change in response to these developments has been examined
in some detail.

Through a new drive for economic integration, an

expansion of the political role of the Warsaw Treaty Organization,
and an intensive ideological campaign, the East European alliance
has adapted to the requirements of the altered external environment.
By the opening of preliminary negotiations for a conference
on security and cooperation in Europe, held in Helsinki in late 1972
and early 1973, the second half of the new alliance strategy began
to emerge.

During the preliminary meetings and during the Conference

of Security and Cooperation in Europe and the talks on Mutual Force
Reductions in Europe, both of which began in 1973, the nature of the
coordinated alliance policy became more clear.

Intimately tied to

the development of new relations within the bloc, the alliance posi
tion at the sessions in Helsinki, Geneva, and Vienna represented a
coordinated vision of a restructured interbloc situation in Europe.

Helsinki, Geneva, and Vienna
Soviet and East European initiatives toward a conference on
security and cooperation in Europe actually date from the signing of
the Warsaw Pact, in which the allies affirmed "their desire to
create a system of collective security in Europe based on the parti
cipation of all European States, irrespective of their social and
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political structure."
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In 1955 and in the decade which followed,

Warsaw Pact proposals were motivated by the desire for the recogni
tion of the post-World War Two boundaries in Europe.

In 1965, with

the territorial situation in Europe considerably more stable, the
Warsaw Pact allies issued a more urgent proposal for "the convocation
of a conference of all European states to discuss measures ensuring
collective security in Europe."
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By the time of the 1969 Budapest Message, the Warsaw Pact
position reflected a more serious desire to confront the new situa
tion in Europe.

Moreover, the Budapest appeal betrayed the existence

of conflicting views among Warsaw Pact members as to the nature and
purpose of the proposed conference.

As Harland Cleveland, former

United States representative to the North Atlantic Council, observed,
A close reading of the Budapest appeal suggested a hard-fought
compromise: The Soviets got their appeal . . , The East German
and Polish "Hawks" got the pre-conditions on which they had been
insisting; and the Czech and Hungarian "Doves" managed to delete
most of the traditional polemics. ^ 9
It might also be added that, through the reference to "respect for the
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independence and sovereignty of states,"
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the Rumanians got the

formal guarantees on which they had insisted.
Beyond the differences revealed in the Budapest Message were
a number of basic differences among the Warsaw Pact allies.

The East

Germans, because of the GDR's advantageous position as the principal
exporter of finished goods in COMECON and because of the leadership's
acute fear of ideological infection, were wary of East-West coopera
tion in any form.

At the other extreme were the Rumanians, bent on

using the process of detente as a means of loosening the Soviet grip
on Eastern Europe.

Between these two extreme positions were a number

of other sources of disagreement in Eastern Europe.

Hungary, for

example, because of its success through bilateral trade arrangements
with the West and through regional cooperation, showed little interest
in pursuing a collective approach toward East-West economic cooperation.
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Nevertheless, between 1969 and 1972 the Soviet Union was able

to promote a substantially unified bloc position toward East-West
cooperation.

Aside from Rumania's Ceausescu, the East European

leaders generally consider the continued presence of Soviet troops to
be useful, and perhaps necessary, for the preservation of domestic
political security.

In terms of economic relations, East European
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leaders share an interest in expanded East-West trade, and they per
ceive the advantages of presenting a coordinated position in dealing
with the West.

Similarly, there is full agreement that relations with

the West must be regulated in such a way as to minimize the possibility
of introducing liberalizing tendencies into the socialist societies.
As the Warsaw Pact position became more unified, the pro
posals for a European security conference became more specific.

The

Prague Declaration of October 31, 1969, set two priorities for the
proposed conference:

the first was a vague recommendation for a

statement renouncing the use of force in Europe, and the second was
a call for nthe expansion of trade, economic and scientific and technical ties."
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From that time on, it has been clear that the main

Warsaw Pact objective is economic cooperation in specific, limited
spheres of activity.

Notably absent from the Prague Declaration was

any mention of mutual force reductions in Europe.

In subsequent pro

posals, too, the Warsaw Pact policy has been simply to avoid the
issue of troop reductions.
The NATO response to the Prague Declaration revealed three
obstacles to holding the conference:

the issue of boundaries in

central Europe, the question of the inclusion of the United States
in the conference, and the issue of the proper scope of the talks,
particularly with regard to the issue of force reductions.

Between

1969 and 1972, West German Ostpolitik successfully resolved the issue

Pravda, November 1, 1969, as translated in The Current
Digest of the Soviet Press 21, November 26, 1969, p. 19.
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of European boundaries.

The other two obstacles, however, were the

subject of intense debate between NATO and the WTO.
The United States was instrumental in establishing a negative
NATO response to the vague proposals in the Prague Declaration.
"Why not, the Americans said, get down to cases and ask the other side
where it stood on balanced and mutual force reductions in Europe?"
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The issue of symmetrical versus asymmetrical cuts, or balanced versus
imbalanced reductions, has remained the principal obstacle in the MFR
talks.

From the NATO perspective, force reductions in central Europe

must be "balanced," rather than equal, to reflect the Warsaw Pact
numerical advantage in troop levels.

The Warsaw Pact position, by

contrast, was that the word "balanced" should be removed from pro
posed talks and that force reduction talks should be held separately
from the broader Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Agreement on M(B)FR was eventually achieved through the
Warsaw Pact "concession" on American participation, an issue which
was obviously raised as a bargaining card for the WTO negotiating
position.

In return for the Warsaw Pact’s acceptance of American

participation, and in return for an apparent concession on the nature
of force reductions, the NATO Council finally agreed "that multilateral
explorations on mutual and balanced force reductions be undertaken as
soon as practicable, either before or in parallel with multilateral
preparatory talks on a Conference on Security and Cooperation in
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Europe.*’

The Council resolution went on to say, however, that the

conference should also concern itself with the free movement of
people, ideas, and information between East and West Europe.
As agreed, the preliminary negotiations for force reduction
talks and for the European Security Conference were held separately.
Although the preparatory talks for the Conference on Mutual and
Balanced Force Reductions officially opened in Vienna on January 31,
1973, the first plenary session did not meet until May 14 because of
procedural differences over participation.

As expected, the principal

source of disagreement was the question of ’’balanced” force reductions.
In the final communique of the preparatory talks a compromise solu
tion was reached:

the word ’’balanced” was dropped in return for the

guarantee that any decision reached would ’’conform to the principle
of undiminished security for each party.”
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It was further agreed

that the first phase of the MFR talks would be held in Vienna in
October.
The preliminary negotiations for the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe were held in Helsinki during four sessions
from November, 1972, to June, 1973.

As was the case in the MFR nego

tiations, the Warsaw Pact strategy was to make concessions which were
sufficiently vague that they could later be reversed.

On the issue of

human and cultural contacts, for example, the Soviet Union agreed that

13^i*
New York Times, February 20, 1972.

[ Emphasis added. ]
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the agenda could include discussions on the "expansion of cultural
co-operation, of contacts between organizations and individuals, and
of dissemination of information."
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The only evidence of Warsaw

Pact dissension was Rumania's successful insistence that the conference
take place "outside the military alliances."
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Having agreed on a

general agenda for CSCE, the participants opened the first phase of
the conference in Helsinki on July 3.
Although it lasted for only four days, the first phase of
CSCE established the basic positions of both East and West.

In a

reversal of the previous Soviet proposal, Foreign Minister Gromyko
argued,
It is clear that co-operation in the cultural field, and the
development of contacts and of exchanges of information, should
be carried out with full observance of the principles . . . of
sovereignty and non-interference. Any departure from this would
be rightfully regarded as an attempt to intrude upon another's
affairs.138
Representing the general view of the West, British Foreign Secretary
Sir Alec Douglas-Home countered by arguing that it is
essential that we should do something to remove the barriers
which inhibit the movement of peoples and the exchange of infor
mation and ideas. . . . The peoples of our countries . . . want
to know whether their lives will be affected for the better by
our efforts.139
By the time the second phase of negotiations began in Geneva

136Ibid., p. 25699.
137Ibid., p. 26013.
138Ibid., p. 26014.
139
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in September, 1973, East and West were firmly divided over the
"Basket Three" proposals regarding human and cultural contacts.

From

the point of view of the West, any meaningful normalization of rela
tions between East and West should include the expansion of human
and cultural contacts.

Implicit in the Western position, of course,

was the belief that expansion of human contacts would lead to the
liberalization of the socialist societies and to a loosening of the
Soviet hegemonic position in Eastern Europe.

The Warsaw Pact posi

tion, reinforced through frequent bilateral and multilateral meetings
among top party leaders and through meetings of the PCC, has been that
the CSCE should result in a resolution formally legitimizing European
borders and establishing, without reference to "Basket Three" pro
posals, a new framework for East-West economic cooperation.
By mid-1975, the Warsaw Pact nations had realized most of their
CSCE objectives.

By offering minor concessions, such as agreeing to

a proposal to reunite families separated by the now rusty Iron
Curtain, the Soviet bloc had elicited the reluctant agreement of the
West.

The final CSCE declaration included a statement on the inviola

bility of European borders, an agreement on noninterference in internal
affairs, a general agreement on the possibility of peaceful border
change, and a vague statement on the virtues of expanded flows of
people and ideas between East and West.

140

It became apparent early that an agreement on MFR could not

For a recent assessment of the security conference, see
Scott Thornton, "Helsinki Summit: New Era or False Hopes,"
Washington Post, July 23, 1975, p. 17.*
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be timed to coincide with the CSCE resolution.

Throughout the MFR

negotiations, which have remained virtually stalled since they began
in October of 1973, East and West have been deadlocked over a number
of questions:

whether troop cuts should be symmetrical or asym

metrical, who should participate in the initial cuts, whether or not
the cuts should include nuclear armaments, and whether or not cuts
should include air as well as ground forces.

The only perceptible

area of agreement was in the decision to provide a few days'
advance notice of military maneuvers.
It has been clear from the start of MFR that the Warsaw Pact
objective was to prevent an agreement on force reductions.

From the

perspectives of the East European leaders, the maintenance of the
power balance in Europe is not enough:

the political leadership in

Eastern Europe, with the exception of Ceausescu, considers the main
tenance of current troop levels to be essential for the preservation
of political security.

Once the initial Warsaw Pact aim--the separa

tion of MFR from the broader security conference--was achieved, the
Warsaw Pact position was to oppose any NATO proposal on force reduc
tions .
From an assessment of the CSCE resolution and the MFR talks at
their present stage, it is clear that no new Concert of Europe is in
the offing.

It is equally clear that the conferences will yield no

specific blueprint for the future of East-West relations in Europe.
Nevertheless, a number of objectives of the Warsaw Pact countries
have already been realized.

First, the resolution on the inviolabi

lity of European borders serves to institutionalize the status quo
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in central Europe.

Second, the agreement on noninterference in inter

nal affairs serves to legitimize the existing nature of political
control in Eastern Europe.

Finally, by having avoided major conces

sions on the issue of human and cultural exchanges, the Soviet bloc
will be able to promote limited cooperation with the West on a
strictly government-to-government basis.

In other words, the CSCE

resolution helps enable the Warsaw Pact countries to regulate the
pattern of East-West exchanges in such a way as to minimize the danger
of ideological "infection."
Of course, the conference resolution has established only a
very general framework for East-West cooperation.

A major question

is whether the Soviet Union and its allies can continue to promote
expanded relations with the West without introducing substantial
changes into the socialist societies.

As has been made clear, it is

through an awareness of the possible consequences of detente that the
Soviet and East European leaders have maintained their determination
to control the character of East-West relations.

Once the flow of

events begins to exceed the capacity of the Warsaw Pact leaders to
deal with them, the new form of cooperation with the West may well
be reversed.

Beyond Detente
To an extent unparalleled in the history of the East European
alliance, the course of alliance integration in the future will be
determined by the nature of external developments.

Domestically, the

process of East-West cooperation has provided the East European
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leaders with an opportunity to revive their stagnant economies, pro
mote greater consumer goods production, and, ultimately, bolster their
political security by establishing a firmer relationship between the
party and the people.

At the same time, the process of detente has

contributed to a drive for alliance unity through improved economic
integration, political coordination, and ideological regeneration.
In order to achieve their objectives in East-West cooperation,
the East European leaders have demonstrated considerable solidarity
at the pan-European conferences.

In an important sense, however,

the solidarity of the past few years is deceptive, for among the East
European leaders there are two opposing tendencies:

one impelling

them toward closer unity in the interests of immediate political secu
rity, and the other impelling them to seek greater independence from
the Soviet Union.

This second inclination is seen in terms of a long

term process through which the East European leaders, following a
♦

period of growing cooperation with the West, will be able to exercise
greater latitude in order to satisfy the needs of their increasingly
restive populaces and restore public confidence in the party.
These two tendencies are far from inconsistent.

For the

immediate present, close alliance unity and "firm friendship with the
Soviet Union," to repeat Ulbricht's phrase, are absolutely required
to control the character of East-West relations.

Once East-West rela

tions have been established on a new, firmer basis, however, the oppor
tunity may present itself for new forms of relations within the bloc.
It is well-recognized, of course, that the Soviet Union is presently
in a position to block any developments perceived to be detrimental to
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Soviet interests.

The hope in Eastern Europe is that the Soviet Union,

in the belief that its position in the bloc is secure, will permit a
greater degree of independence in Eastern Europe.
Clearly, whatever independence is gained in Eastern Europe
will be of a limited sort.

As one Polish scholar has argued, the

era of detente will bring with it "a shifting of forces within the
141
blocs.1’

The ties within the bloc--economic, political, and

ideological--are sufficiently strong to assure that any changes or
"shifting of forces" which may occur will take place within the
existing alliance framework.

Moreover, Soviet determination to main

tain its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, reinforced by prepon
derant Soviet power, dictates the limits of independence in the bloc.
If there is a model for the desired result of this "shifting
of forces," it is that of the Hungarians, not the Rumanians.

The kind

of self-assertiveness in foreign policy familiar in Rumania for a
decade would not be in the interests of the other East European
countries, nor would "another Rumania" be tolerated by the Soviet
Union.

The experience of Hungary in the past few years has consider

ably more appeal.

Through the gradual implementation of economic

reforms and through the cultivation of beneficial trade relations with
the West, Hungary has been able to achieve what is desired most in

141

Jan Sczepanski, "The Fate of Poland and the Polish
Character," Zycie Warszawy, June 4, 1970, as cited by Robert W. Dean,
"Foreign Policy Perspectives and European Security: Poland and
Czechoslovakia," in East European Perspectives on European Security
and Cooperation, ed . Robert R. King and Robert W. Dean (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 122.

120

Eastern Europe:

economic viability and a form of political security

based on the general support of the population.

Moreover, the

Hungarian leadership has been able to achieve its success without
damaging the leading role of the party.
Whether or not the '’shifting of forces” occurs depends on
two factors:

the nature of domestic change in Eastern Europe and

the progress of East-West cooperation.

In the first case, the East

European leaders are well aware that they will be treading a thin
line between expanding the scope of political support on the one
hand and creating the kind of chaos which occurred in Czechoslovakia
on the other.

Any repetition of the Czechoslovak experience, with its

economic experimentation and its acknowledgment of political plural
ism, would result in action as determined, if not as brutal, as the
1968 invasion.

Moreover, any domestic disruptions would raise fears

for political security and would prompt another drive for bloc
unity, a drive which would be supported by the East European as well
as the Soviet leaders.
The second factor affecting alliance change will be the
progress of detente.

It is clear that the Soviet and East European

leaders have great hopes that the new form of cooperation with the
West will provide a partial solution to their economic and political
problems.

One possibility is that the East European leaders may

gain through the process of East-West cooperation sufficient security

For an assessment of the situation in Hungary, see Peter
Bender, East Europe in Search of Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins,
1972), pp. 100-11.
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to permit a gradual relaxation of internal policies.

If internal

change occurs precipitously as the result of expanded East-West
contacts, however, the process of detente may well be reversed in
the interests of bloc unity and political security.
The long process of East European integration has resulted
in substantial and durable ties between the Soviet Union and the
states of Eastern Europe.

Within the existing framework, however,

there is room for substantial change in alliance relationships.
It may well be that the process of East-West cooperation fails to
yield the specific benefits expected in Eastern Europe, or that the
process brings with it liberalizing elements which cannot be toler
ated.

If either of these two possibilities materialize, the result

may be a reversal of d^tenteand a return to domestic repression and
orthodoxy.
There is, however, a more optimistic view of the future.
According to this scenario, the progress of East-West cooperation
will promote mutually beneficial relations and will lead to a situa
tion in which the East European leaders feel sufficiently secure to
permit, with the endorsement of the Soviet Union, a gradual liberali
zation of domestic policies.
In any case, it should be remembered that the objectives of
the two blocs remain basically opposed.

The current era of detente

is the product, not of the abandonment of basic objectives, but of
the existence of an East-West power balance and of the recognition «
that certain objectives can better be achieved through cooperation
than through confrontation.

For the near future, the best that can be

hoped from the process of detente is that the "shifting of forces
will encourage greater stability and cooperation within the frame
work of existing alliances.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CEMA
CMEA
COMECON

)
)
)

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

CPSU

Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CSCE

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

EEC

European Economic Community (Common Market)

GDR

German Democratic Republic (East Germany)

MBFR

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

MFR

Mutual Force Reductions

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PCC

Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization

WTO

Warsaw Treaty Organization
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